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Introduction:
Chester Crocker of Georgetown University outlines the elements of a successful intervention. First, third parties should have a thorough understanding of the substantive issues of the conflict. Second, intervenors need to communicate and coordinate with each other and there should be cooperation between tracks I and II. Third, intervenors should have a clear institutional mandate for their activities. Lastly, Crocker cautions against perfunctory, symbolic interventions that lack institutional support.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Some Elements of a Successful Intervention
Chester Crocker
Georgetown University
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A: I think it's really very
hard to generalize on some of these points. That's our job, is to generalize,
but I think are maybe a few things you can generalize about. You do have to know
your conflict, as well as the parties know it. That means a massive investment
in knowledge; in case knowledge. It means working to recruit, as part of the effort, as many
people as one can who are conflict veterans, so that you wind up with kind of a
series of concentric circles and networks that are, in fact, all with the
mediation or all with the intervention. Now that sounds complicated, and
it may be more appropriate for a Track I actor to try and organize something
like that than a Track II actor. And maybe Track I actors might need that more, like in
Sudan for example.
Why are the Norwegians involved in this thing? They're
involved in it because they have a limited number of people who are literally
world-class on the Sudan conflict, and have decades of experience in dealing
with the Sudanese actors, far more detailed relationships across the spectrum
than any American official has ever had. What we bring to the table as Americans
is that we are Americans. Nobody can say no to the Americans, least of all, the
Southern leadership. John Garang, is very dependent on his support base in this
country. The regime in Khartoum is very anxious to avoid being added to the Axis
of Evil. So that combination makes us a powerful actor, but it doesn't make us a
skilled actor, necessarily. I do think it's important that one start out one of
these things with a sense of trying to recruit partners.
Q: So is that a good combination, skilled Norwegians and powerful Americans?
A: Yeah, and highly knowledgeable Brits are also part of that troika; the
Brits used to run the place, they know it pretty well. They provide a bit of a
balance mechanism because they're more open, perhaps, to the views and voices of
Khartoum and we're more open to the Southern views and voices. There's a balance
in there that's useful. I think it's a good combination. We also, I believe, are
talking to some of the NGOs who are close to this conflict and have a lot of
those relationship skills too, from the humanitarian assistance community and
others. That's another bit of what to remember as you're getting involved. I
think that you should always start with a clear sense of a mandate from
somebody, and you better be damn sure what that mandate is, and have that
conversation upfront.
Q: Somebody like who?
A: Well, like your boss, or like your institutional support base leader,
whoever that might be.
Q: So in the case of the Sudan, for example, who might that be? You mean the
actual negotiators need to have a mandate from, say, the State Department?
A: From their authority structure, whether it's the president or the
secretary or whoever. Sometimes people think of these situations as, oh, well we
don't know what else to do, let's have a mediation. My advice is don't
ever accept that assignment. If that's the reason, if that's the motivation,
don't do it.
Q: In other words, if it's a last choice?
A: Oh yeah, or to be seen doing something.
Q: Oh, I see.
A: Just a C.Y.A., you know. We don't know what else to do, so we'll send
Cye Vance and David Owen out there to try and resolve the Bosnian problem. Not
that we seriously are going to support them, or even that we care what they say
to each other, but at least we can say, oh they're doing something. It's a bit
of a C.Y.A. operation in that regard. This is another point that I think is
crucial, you've got to have some coherence in a third-party intervention. There
are so many cases where you have a multiplicity of actors. One of our books is
on multi-party mediation, you may have seen it, it's called Herding Cats, and
it's about multi-party structures. Those are inevitable, I think, in the modern
age because lots of people get involved. It's one thing to get involved, it's
something else to get involved coherently, which means that people talk to each
other, and they may be able to share assignments and share burdens and that kind
of thing.
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