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Introduction:
One of the problems with the Oslo agreements, according to Herb Kelman, is that they couldn't be done in the open, but because of the secrecy, the constituencies weren't "brought along" and weren't ready to accept the agreements.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Secrecy and the Oslo Accords
Herb Kelman
Professor Emeritus, Program on Negotiation, Harvard University
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There are a number of problems with Oslo. It cannot be evaluated as a track II
process. It was a track I process, or at least the outcome was an official
political agreement and there is the anomaly, and I wrote about this long before
Oslo failed, that there was a contradiction in the sense that in order for an
agreement to emerge, the process had to be secret. If it had been public it
would have been shot down long before it got to the point of agreement. But
because it was secret there wasn't the opportunity to build the constituencies
for it and that was an inherent problem to which there was no solution. There
would have been no Oslo if it hadn't been secret, there wouldn't have been any
agreement. So you couldn't solve that problem. It should have been taken into
account, and there should have been explicit efforts to build these
constituencies afterward and not enough of that was done.
...
The other cost
of the reserve option is that they didn't, in a way they couldn't, but they
didn't even when they could have, educate their publics.
It was difficult to educate their publics to a solution, to the reason and
the value and the cost of a solution, which they weren't willing to state,
publicly. Rabin wasn't prepared to say we are committed to a two-state solution
and tell his public here is what that means, here is the price we have to pay,
e.g. settlements, and it's worth it, it's good for us and them, it's good for
peace. He wasn't ready to fully do that. Arafat had no problem with saying a two-state solution but he wasn't prepared to say that this means the end of the
conflict, this means very serious compromises on the issue of the right of
return. He wasn't prepared to say those things. They didn't really educate their
publics properly and bring them along. It was a consequence of the fact that
what was the obvious implication of Oslo was left implicit rather than explicit.
But, again, they weren't ready to make it explicit so the choice was do you have an
agreement with all of these flaws or do you have no agreement? My own feeling is
that I wish they had been more aware of the limitations and done more to correct
for them in the post-Oslo process but I am still glad that they came up with the
Oslo Agreement and I still think that it represents a fundamental breakthrough.
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