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Introduction:
Richard Rubensten, professor of conflict resolution and
public affairs at George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, talks about common misconceptions associated with terrorism. He points
out that it is counterproductive to conceive of terrorists as evil because it
misdiagnoses both the goals and causes of terrorist activity. To avoid
seeking rational reasons for what seem to be grotesque methods is to avoid taking
responsibility for some of the conditions that give rise to terrors. This in turn
limits the possibilities for addressing the problem in an effective manner.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Terrorism
Richard Rubenstein
Professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
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Q: Let's talk about terrorism a little bit: fundamentalism, extremism, other
"isms." Are there common misconceptions about terrorism or religious
terrorism that people dealing with conflict resolution should be aware of?
A: Well, the common misconceptions about religious terrorism are pretty much
an extension of the common misconceptions about secular, or non-religious,
terrorism. The interesting thing about terrorism, and this is kind of a side
remark, is that in a way it's always religious. If you look at the ideologies
and forms of organization, practices, and so forth of the secular terrorists,
beginning with Narodnaya Volya, the Russian terrorists in the 19th century, you
find that in some ways they seemed structurally a whole lot like religious
terrorism, or vice versa. That is to say they often involve martyrdom, they
often involve a kind of faith that if we do these violent acts, ultimately our
cause will triumph. And it's not necessarily a rational thing, it's pure faith,
it's a leap of faith. They often involve extreme feelings of unworthiness and
dedication on the part of the martyrs.
One of the figures in a book of mine is a Russian socialist revolutionary, a member of
the socialist revolutionary party in the first decade of the 1900s named Kaliayev.
He was also the subject of a play by Camus and Kaliayev is the guy who
decided he was going to throw himself along with his bomb under the Grand Duke
Sergei's carriage and blow himself up with the grand duke. His theory about that
was that his death would compensate for the death of another person.
These were highly moral people in the sense that they didn't believe in
taking a life without giving a life. They had kind of a weird theory of
compensation. If we weren't so anti-Islamic, basically, and
anti-terrorist, I mean if we wanted to look at terrorism with a little more
detachment instead of seeing even the terrorists of 9/11 as monstrous beasts and
unreasoning fanatics and so forth, you might even also see there an indication of the
same kind of theory of compensation: If we're going to take life, we're going to
give it.
Q: As opposed to some kind of laser-guided bomb that drops onto somewhere and
is more immoral?
A: Yes, as opposed to the totally impersonal. You know, partly people do
terrorism because it's the only form of violence that's available to them. They
don't have the laser-guided bombs. But people keep asking me, why don't they
explode a dirty bomb in Tel Aviv or Washington or someplace? And I don't think
the answer is because they don't have it, I think the answer is because it's not
their style for lots of other reasons. But anyway, in Man's Fate by Andre
Malraux, a great book, one of the protagonists of the book is a Chinese
terrorist called Chen, who is a communist. He's proposing to throw himself at
the limousine of Chiang Kai-Shek and blow himself up along with Chiang Kai-Shek.
He's taking his leave, he's saying farewell to his comrades, and they say what
do you want to tell us as you leave? And he says, multiply the martyrs. He says
an idea is only as strong as the amount of blood shed in its name. One of his
comrades says, 'You're making a religion of terrorism.' And he says, 'That's
right.' So, there are these parallels between religious terrorism and
non-religious terrorism anyway. But the original question was how do people
think about it.
Well, they think that terrorists are either mad or bad. There's the theory
that they're crazy, which had to be abandoned because of studies beginning with
Walter Laqueur at Columbia, and lots and lots of studies showing terrorists are
not crazy. They represent a wide spectrum of personality types. And are they
bad? Well, yes, of course you can say anybody who takes innocent life is bad,
and you want to call them a fanatic or evil. But the way that George Bush and
people in his administration and others around the world who are opposing
terrorism use this kind of Augustinian concept of evil, that the terrorists are
evil, it's totally ahistorical. It's not just saying these people are bad because
they shouldn't have done this, they hurt innocent people and it's not
proportional to the injury that they were done, or whatever you want to say;
making an ethical argument against it is fine. But to view it as absolute evil,
as some eruption from the underworld, is a way of refusing to deal with it as an
historical phenomenon.
And the reason people refuse to deal with it as an historical phenomenon is
because they don't want to implicate themselves. The don't want to take
responsibility for themselves as actors in history, for being part of a
situation that produced terrorists. To my mind that's what's really crazy. It's
certainly self-defeating because if the United States can't recognize the role
that U.S. imperialism and participation in various kinds of globalistic schemes, if
they can't recognize the role of U.S. activities abroad, whether it's economic
activities or propping up dictatorships or spying or selling arms or whatever,
they can't see that they have something to do with the conditions that spawn
terrorism, then we're never going to get rid of it.
So in conflict resolution, it seems to me, this is the conflict analysis
part, and that's what we can do and need to do. We're doing some of it already.
We need to do more of it. It's not a question of blaming America, but it's a
question of blaming - if you want to blame - a global system, in which America
is a major player, that produces violence. But it also means being willing to
take the heat. If we're going to say that we're blaming America, then we'll have
to take that heat, because if we don't analyze this system which some American
interests are profiting from as being productive of terrorism, then we're not
going to be able to do anything about it.
Q: So say we do become self-aware of our own role in generating terrorists
and unsymmetrical attacks-
A: Before you finish that sentence, how do you become aware? Conflict
resolution can't just be considered mediation and facilitation in the narrow
sense of having two parties or more parties and they all sit around the table
and you facilitate. In this case, conflict resolution would involve, I think,
facilitating a congressional hearing on the real causes of terrorism. Or putting
a multi-organizational task force together to do a report based on interviews,
based on first-hand information, of how the system operates that seems to be
generating violence, and what the alternatives are.
I mean, could you get Osama bin Laden and George Bush together to sit at the
same table without having one or the other of them immediately blow up the
table, just as a thinking game? They would not be able to begin to solve
the problem, not only because they're both so narrow minded, but also because it
takes the kind of capacity to analyze the system that they'd need more people to
help them do that. So how to do that kind of analysis of the system and have it be
the sort of analysis that real people in the real world would pay any attention
to? I don't know.
We're trying to set up a new kind of think tank in Washington that would be
an alliance of forces interested in doing that kind of analysis. It would be
great if the United States Institute of Peace were interested in it, but they're
not. They're compromised by their dependence on government funds. There may be
some congressmen and senators who would be interested in doing this sort of
thing, who realize that we're kind of short of ideas on what the alternatives to
the imperial model are. So I think this in an important new frontier for
conflict resolution.
Q: So basically we're inventing the tools right now to deal with terrorism?
A: That's exactly right. Exactly right.
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