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Introduction:
William Steubner, executive director of the Alliance for International
Conflict Prevention and Resolution, talks about his experience negotiating peace settlements between the
Salvadoran military and the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation) forces. He suggests
that even after has a conflict has become ripe for negotations, it may be difficult to "sell"
to conflict profiteers.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Negotiating in El Salvador
William Steubner
Executive Director, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution
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Q: Can you talk to me a little bit about your work in El Salvador. I
know it is a question that you could sit here for two hours about, but sort of
an overview?
A: I was more Track I, and I was an army officer at the time. I had actually
fought in the war and was involved directly, there weren't many people that
were.
Q: This is the civil war, not the war between El Salvador and Honduras?
A: No, this is the war in El Salvador that went on for twelve years. What we
ultimately decided was that we had to find a way to end that thing. People were
sick of the war. A lot of the time that is the way a conflict ends, people are
just tired, they are worn out. They are like a drunk that has hit the bottom.
You need to look at the relatively minor things that you have to do to actually
put an end to it. What we did was we looked at, what do we want here? We decided
what we wanted was a society where people decided that you change things in a
ballot box and with advocacy rather than with a gun, and that you have a respect
for the law. We said, "Well, why don't we have that?" We looked at the
actors on both sides that were keeping us from getting to peace when the vast
majority of the people wanted it, and then we had to look for ways to put
pressure on those people to make them realize that peace could be more in their
interest than continuing to fight. I think we were relatively effective there.
Q: That is basically a strategy of convincing the people who had the
most to gain by the war that they could gain even more through peace?
A: Yes, and that they could lose a lot more by continuing to fight.
Q: How did you do that? Was that direct negotiations with the commanders of
the rebelling armies?
A: We had a lot of leverage on the government's side, so by identifying the
actors there who wanted to keep it going, we were able to use that leverage and
put the pressure on them. We were convincing them that they were not going to be
able to get the things that they wanted in the future. They weren't going to get
to go to Miami, they weren't going to get a visa, and they were going to stay
right there if they were going to mess this thing up.
Q: Â…because they were going to go war trials if they left the
country?
A: That was eliminated in the peace talks and it was eliminated by mutual
agreement between the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation) guerillas and
the military, they both needed amnesty and they gave each other amnesty. There
was no recourse to that but having the proper people threaten certain people on
the military side saying, "I will use every influence I possess to make
sure that you are never aloud to enter the US, and you will not receive any more
assistance and there will not be anything coming in that you can steal." On
the guerilla side it was different, the top-level guerillas were not the
problem, they were cocktail circuit revolutionaries. Most of them had hardly
been in the country for ten years. They realized that the gravy train was over,
the wall had come down, and they weren't going to get a lot of support any more;
it was the mid-level guerillas.
The mid-level leader was the problem because
there was nothing in it for him for peace. As a guerilla leader, as a mid-level
commander he was a big man in macho society, he had the best weapons, and the
prettiest girl for his radio operator. In war he had a place, usually he was a
guy who wasn't really educated and didn't have any skills. If there was peace,
even if his physical security was guaranteed, what was in it for him? We worked
with NGOs a lot to see what would really motivate these guys to say, "Ok it
is time for me to hang up the old kalashnikov." That is the way that we
approached it.
Q: Do you remember some highlights of what those incentives were?
A: Number one, you had to put pressure on them, you had to make their life
more uncomfortable because if we could look back over a period of years we would
see that the FMLN guerillas were very professional, they kept of records almost
like the Nazis, you could track everything. Over a period of years you could see
these guys were never getting hurt, it was always the little guys that were
getting hurt, and it was the same thing on the government side. You had to put
more pressure on them and start making them feel insecure, to think, "If I
continue this war then somebody is going to get me." You had to give them
the incentive and you had to give them a rock hard guarantee that they weren't
going to be murdered if they laid their weapons down, and then you had to show
them what was a path to a new career for them. That was true even for lower
level guerillas, because in an agricultural county, so many had been guerillas
for so long, that they had never learned how to farm. You couldn't just give
them land, seeds, and some tools. You had to teach them to farm, so that was
part of what was built in the peace process.
Q: What kind of coordination between Track I and Track II during that
decommissioning process.
A: We as Track I people didn't have the kind of access that the unofficial
actors had because when you are in the government you cant just go talk to what
is considered the bad guys. The NGOs, the Track II people, have more flexibility
and access. Early on we couldn't go directly to the guerilla leaders to find out
what would motivate them.
Q: Let me just clarify, you couldn't go there because it would be seen as
sanctioning their existence?
A: And you are an official government person. You can't just go out and
talk to Carlos H. Romero (?). Later we could, once the ice was broken, but
initially we got the insights on the thinking of the guerillas about peace
really from NGOs who were free to talk with them. A lot of times we didn't even
talk with the NGOs, we took reports that they wrote. One time there was a really
excellent report from the Wooshland Office in Latin America but I never even
told them but we inserted a lot into the peace talks from things that came right
from their reports, like guaranteeing security. We had to push the government
and military to accept joint-police force; that was going to be one of the
securities. You had to get rid of the old national police and La Guardia. What
we did there is we used the example of Nicaragua where at times when there
wasn't a joint police force then there were unexplained killings. We were able
to go the military who would go back and forth and say, "Why should any
body stop fighting if there is not some guarantees like this where you have
people from both sides involved, because you have no security?"
Q: That is great. Thank you very much. You were a commander in the
army?
A: I was a low level major.
Q: How did you get to point where you were negotiating all that stuff?
A: Number one because I had credibility with the Salvadoran military. I never
lied to them. I always drew the line, always told them what was unacceptable,
and never being willing to compromise. They respected that. Then I worked for
two republican political appointees in a row who wanted peace in El Salvador,
who believed in human rights, so I had there full backing. My only last two jobs
in my last eighteen months in the army were to promote the peace talks and to
promote the prosecution of the Jesuit murder case.
Q: Thanks.
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