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While most studies on the peaceful settlement of disputes focus on the substance of the negotiations, the timing of the negations is also key. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so -- when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that "ripe" moment, they seek or are amenable to proposals that offer a way out.
The idea of a ripe moment lies at the fingertips of diplomats. As long ago as 1974, Henry Kissinger recognized that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement." Conversely, practitioners often are heard to say that certain mediation initiatives are not advisable because the conflict just is not yet "ripe."
The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) -- a situation in which neither side can win, yet continuing the conflict will be very harmful to each (although not necessarily in equal degree nor for the same reasons). Also contributing to "ripeness" is an impending, past, or recently-avoided catastrophe.[1] This further encourages the parties to seek an alternative policy or "way out," since, the catastrophe provides a deadline or a lesson indicating that pain might be sharply increased if something is not done about it soon.
The mutually hurting stalemate is grounded in cost-benefit analysis. It is fully consistent with public-choice notions of rationality[2] and public-choice studies of negotiation.[3] These theories assume that a party will pick the alternative which is best for itself, and that a decision to change is induced by increasing pain associated with the present course of conflict, thereby making the change the rational choice from a cost-benefit point of view. It is also consistent with which hypothesizes that people seek to avoid a loss of a certain amount more than they seek a gain of the same amount. In other words, they are "loss-averse." In terms of game theory, a mutually hurting stalemate changes the situation from a prisoners' dilemma game into a game of chicken. (These terms and games are described in detail in the game theory essay.) Put in other terms, a conflict becomes ripe for resolution when the parties realize that the status quo -- no negotiation -- is a negative sum (or lose-lose) situation, not a zero-sum (win-lose) situation. Thus to avoid the mutual loss, they must consider negotiation in an attempt to reach a positive sum (or win-win) outcome.
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Ripeness is a matter of perception, and as with any subjective perception, there are likely to be objective facts to be perceived. These can be highlighted by a mediator or an opposing party when they are not immediately recognized by the party itself, and resisted so long as the conflicting party refuses to recognize the "facts" as legitimate or accurate. Thus it is the perception of the objective condition, not the condition itself, that makes for a mutually hurting stalemate. If the parties do not recognize "clear evidence" (in someone else's view) that they are at an impasse, a mutually hurting stalemate has not (yet) occurred, and if they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the "evidence," the mutually hurting stalemate is present.
The other element necessary for a ripe moment is less complex and also perceptional: a Way Out. Parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution; they must only have a sense that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search for a solution too. Without a sense of a Way Out, the push associated with the mutually hurting stalemate would leave the parties with nowhere to go. Spokespersons often indicate whether they do or do not feel that a deal can be made with the other side. They think concessions will be reciprocated, not just banked particularly when there is a change in that judgment.[4]
Ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient for the initiation of negotiations. It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator. Thus, it is not identical to its results, which are not part of its definition. It is therefore not tautological, although some scholars have claimed such, arguing that it cannot be measured except by the success of negotiations, after which one can observe that "the time was ripe." Not all ripe moments are seized and turned into negotiations, hence the importance of specifying the meaning and evidence of ripeness so as to indicate when conflicting or third parties can fruitfully initiate negotiations.
Finding a ripe moment requires research to identify the objective and subjective elements of a conflict situation. Subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the cost of further escalation are important, as are objective evidence of stalemate and data on actual costs. Also important is a sense of a Way Out--the sense that a solution is possible and an indication from one or both parties that they might be ready to seek a solution. On the contrary, if one or both sides believe that negotiation is bound to fail, or they still believe they can escalate out of the current impasse to achieve a decisive victory, then the conflict is not yet "ripe." Perhaps a greater understanding of the indicators of ripeness could lead to its more frequent recognition among disputing parties, and more successfully seized negotiation opportunities.
[1] I William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 66-78; I William Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts," in Managing US-Soviet Rivalry, ed. Alexander George (Westview, 1983); Saadia Touval & I William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Westview, 1985), ll, 258-60; I William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford, 1985/1989)
[2] Sen l970, Arrow l963, Olson l965
[3] Brams l990, l994; Wright l965
[4] Zartman & Aurik l99l
Use the following to cite this article:
Zartman, I. William. "Ripeness." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Identifying Ripe Times for Negotiation.
Available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/idripe.htm.
The possibility of successfully negotiating an agreement can be greatly increased when the parties understand how to determine when the time is "ripe" for negotiated settlement and how to encourage the "ripening" process.
Krueger, Cosima. "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing--Article Summary." University of Colorado Conflict Research Consortium.
Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10506/.
This page is a summary of the article, The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing, by Jeffery Rubin. Rubin argues that although the concepts of "timing" and "ripeness" are crucial to the successful de-escalation of international conflicts, these concepts are sometimes dismissed by social scientists because of their highly subjective nature. He defines timing as the importance of doing things in one sequence or at one time rather than another. He defines ripeness as "the right time" (to do something).
Offline (Print) Sources
Greig, J. M. "Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:6, December 1, 2001.
This article examines the factors that influence both short term and long term mediation success.
Aggestam, Karin. "Ripeness in International Mediation." Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations 9:2, 1995.
Kleiboer, Marieke. "Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?." Journal of Peace Research 31:1, February 1994.
Abstract: The theories of Zartman, Haass and Stedman focus on the notion of ripeness of conflict. In their view, conflict resolution depends above all on the identification of a ripe moment in the course of a conflict. This is the only time a third party has any chance to succeed. This essay seeks to provide an answer to the question whether the idea of ripeness is a fruitful notion in the discussion of third-party intervention. In doing so, the empirical usefulness and theoretical foundation of the idea of ripeness in the three studies are examined and compared. The analysis has five parts: (1) it discusses the concept of ripeness as developed by the three authors; (2) it looks at the role of a third party in relation to such ripe moments; (3) it compares the methodological basis on which the idea of ripeness has come about and how it has been used in the three books; (4) and it assesses the analytical value of ripeness as an explanatory and prescriptive tool. In the conclusion (5) the author provides three arguments why the notion of ripeness in the way it has been approached so far is problematic. The idea of willingness is proposed as a useful alternative.
Zartman, I. William. "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond." In International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Edited by Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, September 2000.
Zartman lays out his basic concept of ripeness and the hurting stalemate in this book chapter.
Zartman, I. William. "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula and Mediation." In Perspectives on Negotiation. Edited by BenDahmane, Diane, ed. Government Printing Office, January 1, 1986.
Arrow, Kenneth. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, January 1, 1963.
This is the classic essay in the logic of choice by collective entities based upon the preferences of the individual members of the collectivity. It therefore provides a basis for a critical evaluation of democratic theory in general as well as of the theory of economic policy and welfare economics in particular. First, several apparently reasonable conditions for the process of social choice are laid down; these require essentially that social choice be responsive to the desires of individuals and that, among any given set of possible alternatives, social choice depend only on the preferences of the individuals among the members of that set. It is then shown that this set of conditions is in fact logically inconsistent. That is, there is no democratic constitution which can always be sure of producing a method of social choice that satisfies certain ordinary properties of coherence. Some possible ways out of this dilemma are than explored.
Rubin, Jeffrey Z. "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing." In Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Edited by Thorson, Stuart J., ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
The author says that although the concepts of "timing" and "ripeness" are crucial to the successful de-escalation of international conflicts, these concepts are sometimes dismissed by social scientists because of their highly subjective nature. He defines timing as the importance of doing things in one sequence or at one time rather than another. He defines ripeness as "the right time" (to do something). [online abstract]
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
Norlen, Tova. A Study of the Ripe Moment for Conflict Resolution and its Applicability to Two Periods in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Uppsala University Conflict Resolution Program, January 1, 1995.
Tova Norlen is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
"Conflict 'Ripeness' Revisited: The South Africa and Israel/Palestine Cases." Negotiation Journal 15:1, January 1, 1999.
"This article seeks to develop such generalizations and to refine the ripeness concept by analyzing the factors that led to negotiated agreements between the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in 1990 and between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. Highlighted in each case will be the influence of internal politics, which, I conclude, is overlooked by ripeness propositions, along with the role of perceptual
shifts regarding the possibility and the necessity of negotiation."
Sambanis, Nicholas. "Conflict Resolution Ripeness and Spoiler Problems in Cyprus." Journal of Peace Research , January 2000.
Salla, Michael E. "Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 34:4, November 1, 1997.
This paper presents an anlysis of the East Timor conflict that is grounded in William Zartman's notion of 'ripeness' and John Burton's 'basic human needs' theory. This paper argues that a means of breaking out of the present impasse in negotiations concerning the East Timor conflict is to create what Zartman calls the 'ripe moment'.
Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 1, 1989.
This study examines the causes and nature of African conflict and addresses the issue of how foreign powers can contribute productively to the management and resolution of such conflicts without resorting to the use of military force. The book focuses on four case studies of local conflict and external response (Western Sahara, the Horn of Africa, the Shaba province in Zaire, and Namibia) to assess various approaches to conflict management, and offers guidelines for identifying the ripe moment for effective external response.
Pruitt, Dean G. "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks." International Negotiation 2:2, 1997.
Grounded in ripeness theory, this article discusses the circumstances that motivated the convening of the Middle Eastern Oslo negotiations.
Baker, James and Thomas de Frank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 . New York, NY: Putnam, September 1995.
"Baker, who served in senior government positions under Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush, offers an inside account of his years as Secretary of State during a time period that saw the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, repression in China's Tiananmen Square, freedom in South Africa, the Gulf War, and Arab and Israeli peace talks. He provides intimate portraits of world leaders and insights on the art and politics of diplomacy."
-From Book News, Inc.
Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, July 1991.
Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts is a collection of essays which explore the context, policies and strategies of effective conflict de-escalation. Click here for more info.
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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
The Strange Demise of Jim Crow . Directed and/or Produced by: Berman, David. California Newsreel. 1998.
This film highlights how civil rights activists usefully created situations of non-violent conflict as a way to engage the opposing side, and to create an atmosphere ripe for negotiation. Click here for more info.
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