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The parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary condition for the opening of negotiations to end a conflict. Once all sides realize they cannot win with further escalation, and the status quo is unacceptably damaging (this is a hurting stalemate), the conflict is said to be "ripe" for resolution. While that perception may be insufficient in and of itself, the absence of ripeness does not mean we should walk away and do nothing. Too often, the absence of ripeness is cited as an excuse for total disengagement. However, that is when efforts are needed more than ever to move the conflict to the point where it is susceptible to mediation or negotiation. If a conflict is not ripe, it can be ripened, and if an interested party cannot ripen it, it can position itself for later involvement. Indeed, if ripeness is not present, its components can serve as a target that helps identify obstacles and suggests ways of handling them and managing the problem until resolution becomes possible. Even when a conflict is ripe for negotiation, practitioners need to employ all their skills and apply all the concepts of negotiation and mediation to take advantage of that necessary but insufficient condition in order to turn it into a successful dispute resolution process.
Since ripeness theory indicates that ripeness is a subjective perception that results from objective indicators plus persuasion, these are the two elements that require attention in ripening. The parties need to feel that they are in a mutually hurting stalemate and that there is a way out only through negotiation, mediation or a related non-coercive process. If some objective elements are present, persuasion is needed to bring out the perception of both the stalemate and the pain. For example, two factions in a church congregation may be at loggerheads over the appointment of a particular pastor. If both sides think they can prevail, they may need a third party to step in to demonstrate 1) why neither side can "win," and 2) what the costs are of continuing the conflict.
The other element critical to persuasion is the perception of a way out, a realization -- necessarily bilateral -- that the other party is willing to join in the search for a negotiated solution and that such a solution does exist in principle. The perception of a way out need not identify a specific agreement, but rather merely the belief that an agreement can be found. It is as much a perception of the other party's willingness to bargain as it is of a bargaining range. In its absence, a third party or internal faction is needed to encourage that perception, but also to encourage thinking about possible solutions. Third parties may also need to be involved much more directly, serving as a go-between to carry each party's perception of a possible agreement to the other.
If there is no objective indicator to which to refer, ripening may involve an even more active engagement of the mediator, altering that role from communication and formulation to manipulation.[3] For example, some of the things a mediator can do are:
- Give the parties some fresh ideas to shake them up;
- Keep new ideas loose and flexible and avoid getting bogged down early in details;
- Establish basic principles to form building blocks of a settlement;
- Become an indispensable channel for negotiation; and
- Establish an acceptable mechanism for negotiation and an appropriate format for registering an agreement.
Other strategies include items identified with pre-negotiations:[5]
- Identify the issues to be resolved, and separate out issues not resolvable in the conflict;
- Air alternatives to the current conflict course;
- Establish bridges between the parties;
- Clarify costs and risks involved in seeking settlement;
- Establish reciprocity, the sense that each party will reciprocate the other's concessions; and
- Build support for any proposed settlement.
None of these things is easy to do, of course, nor are they done quickly. But working toward these goals, even when the conflict is not "ripe," is likely to create a ripe moment much more quickly than letting the conflict simply follow its normal course.
[1] Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger (Bantam, 1976), 52.
[2] Chester A, Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (Norton, 1992), 381-82 ia.
[3] I William Zartman & Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, & Pamela Aall, Managing Global Chaos (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997); Touval, Saadia, "Mediators' Leverage," (National Academy of Sciences, Commission on Conflict Resolution, 1999); Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa (Washington: Brookings, 1997).
[4] Crocker, 471-72; see also Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending (Yale University Press, 1990); Marrack Goulding, Enhancing the United Nations' Effectiveness in Peace and Security (United Nations: Report to the Secretary General, June 30, 1997).
[5] Stein, et al. l994.
Use the following to cite this article:
Zartman, I. William. "Ripeness-Promoting Strategies." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness-promoting_strategies/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Mitchell, Christopher R. "Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing." , January 1, 1996
Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mic01/.
This paper contributes to the debate about the circumstances likely to result in a restoration of realistic costing and a movement from antagonistic to conciliatory behavior. The author provides a detailed analysis of Zartman's and others' pioneering work in this area and evaluates the Hurting Stalemate, Imminent Mutual Catastrophe, and Entrapment models as inducements to negotiated problem solving. He counterposes an Enticing Opportunity model to these "exhaustion" models and suggests that positive inducements to change may be as effective or more effective than anticipated costs as a motivator in changing violent behavior.
Fisher, Ronald J. "Methods of Third-Party Intervention."
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/fisher_hb.pdf.
This article lays out the different forms of third-party intervention in a taxonomy of six methods, and proposes a contingency model which matches each type of intervention to the appropriate stage of conflict escalation. Interventions are sequenced, in order to assist the parties in de-escalating and resolving the conflict. The article also discusses several issues around the practice of intervention.
Krueger, Cosima. "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing--Article Summary." University of Colorado Conflict Research Consortium.
Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10506/.
This page is a summary of the article, The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing, by Jeffery Rubin. Rubin argues that although the concepts of "timing" and "ripeness" are crucial to the successful de-escalation of international conflicts, these concepts are sometimes dismissed by social scientists because of their highly subjective nature. He defines timing as the importance of doing things in one sequence or at one time rather than another. He defines ripeness as "the right time" (to do something).
Offline (Print) Sources
Burgess, Heidi. "Constructive Confrontation: A Transformative Approach to Intractable Conflicts." Mediation Quarterly 13:4, 1996.
This article describes the conflict strategy of constructive confrontation. This strategy may be used to approach intractable conflicts that are not yet ripe for resolution. Developed in the context of large-scale public policy and international conflicts, this approach parallels transformative mediation in several ways. Most important is an emphasis on empowerment and recognition (though constructive confrontation uses different terms) and a focus on constructive processes rather than resolution as the primary goal. The article highlights the similarities and differences between constructive confrontation and transformative mediation. Click here for more info.
Zartman, I. William and Saadia Touval. "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era." In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Edited by Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds. Washington, DC : United States Institute of Peace Press, September 1996.
"Mediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves." [p. 446] Zartman and Touval focus on mediation of violent, international, or civil conflicts. They describe why third-parties decide to mediate, why and when conflicting parties accept mediation, and what factors produce effective mediation.
Touval, Saadia. "Mediators' Leverage." , 1999.
Haass, Richard N. "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes." Survival 30:3, 1988.
Aggestam, Karin. "Ripeness in International Mediation." Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations 9:2, 1995.
Kleiboer, Marieke. "Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?." Journal of Peace Research 31:1, February 1994.
Abstract: The theories of Zartman, Haass and Stedman focus on the notion of ripeness of conflict. In their view, conflict resolution depends above all on the identification of a ripe moment in the course of a conflict. This is the only time a third party has any chance to succeed. This essay seeks to provide an answer to the question whether the idea of ripeness is a fruitful notion in the discussion of third-party intervention. In doing so, the empirical usefulness and theoretical foundation of the idea of ripeness in the three studies are examined and compared. The analysis has five parts: (1) it discusses the concept of ripeness as developed by the three authors; (2) it looks at the role of a third party in relation to such ripe moments; (3) it compares the methodological basis on which the idea of ripeness has come about and how it has been used in the three books; (4) and it assesses the analytical value of ripeness as an explanatory and prescriptive tool. In the conclusion (5) the author provides three arguments why the notion of ripeness in the way it has been approached so far is problematic. The idea of willingness is proposed as a useful alternative.
Pruitt, Dean G. "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks." International Negotiation 2:2, 1997.
Grounded in ripeness theory, this article discusses the circumstances that motivated the convening of the Middle Eastern Oslo negotiations.
Zartman, I. William. "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond." In International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Edited by Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, September 2000.
Zartman lays out his basic concept of ripeness and the hurting stalemate in this book chapter.
Zartman, I. William. "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula and Mediation." In Perspectives on Negotiation. Edited by BenDahmane, Diane, ed. Government Printing Office, January 1, 1986.
Rubin, Jeffrey Z. "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing." In Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Edited by Thorson, Stuart J., ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
The author says that although the concepts of "timing" and "ripeness" are crucial to the successful de-escalation of international conflicts, these concepts are sometimes dismissed by social scientists because of their highly subjective nature. He defines timing as the importance of doing things in one sequence or at one time rather than another. He defines ripeness as "the right time" (to do something). [online abstract]
Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, July 1991.
Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts is a collection of essays which explore the context, policies and strategies of effective conflict de-escalation. Click here for more info.
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
"Conflict 'Ripeness' Revisited: The South Africa and Israel/Palestine Cases." Negotiation Journal 15:1, January 1, 1999.
"This article seeks to develop such generalizations and to refine the ripeness concept by analyzing the factors that led to negotiated agreements between the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in 1990 and between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. Highlighted in each case will be the influence of internal politics, which, I conclude, is overlooked by ripeness propositions, along with the role of perceptual
shifts regarding the possibility and the necessity of negotiation."
Bercovitch, Jacob. "Conflict Management and the Oslo Experience: Assessing the Success of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking." International Negotiation 2:2, 1997.
The Oslo experience and the signing of an agreement between Israel and the PLO is used as an empirical case study to highlight the nature of successful mediation in international conflicts. To provide a structure for the analysis, the concept of intractable conflicts and their management is utilized. Factors affecting the mediation of intractable conflicts are grouped into two clusters: (a) contextual factors and (b) process factors. The paper focuses on the changing balance of contextual factors and how these created a ripe moment for mediation, and on the particular way the mediation process was carried out. Timing, ripeness and secrecy are identified as the crucial variables that produced the breakthrough in Oslo.
Salla, Michael E. "Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 34:4, November 1, 1997.
This paper presents an anlysis of the East Timor conflict that is grounded in William Zartman's notion of 'ripeness' and John Burton's 'basic human needs' theory. This paper argues that a means of breaking out of the present impasse in negotiations concerning the East Timor conflict is to create what Zartman calls the 'ripe moment'.
Crocker, Chester A. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, January 1993.
This work presents former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989, Chester A. Crocker's, account of U.S. diplomatic policy in southern Africa during the Reagan Administration. The author argues that the U.S.'s policy of "constructive enegagement" helped bring regional security to southern Africa.
Rothchild, Donald S. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 1997.
In this work Rothchild explores the post-colonial state in selected parts of the African continent in terms of concepts drawn from the literature of comparative and international politics. He traces Africa's current unrest back to its beginnings during the era of colonial rule. The author then discusses how negotiation and mediation can be used along with political incentives such as power sharing, and other actions may be employed to promote reconciliation.
Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 1, 1989.
This study examines the causes and nature of African conflict and addresses the issue of how foreign powers can contribute productively to the management and resolution of such conflicts without resorting to the use of military force. The book focuses on four case studies of local conflict and external response (Western Sahara, the Horn of Africa, the Shaba province in Zaire, and Namibia) to assess various approaches to conflict management, and offers guidelines for identifying the ripe moment for effective external response.
Golan, Matti. The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East. New York: Bantam, 1976.
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