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As conflict escalates, adversaries begin to make greater threats and impose harsher negative sanctions. In some cases, these conflicts spiral completely out of control. Given the highly destructive role that escalation plays, it is important to develop strategies to avoid, limit and reverse this process. De-escalation involves changes within each of the adversaries, as well as new forms of interaction between them. In highly escalated conflicts, de-escalation may not occur until the parties have reached a prolonged stalemate in which both sides are being harmed by continuing the confrontation. Once the parties realize this, they are more likely to be willing to negotiate a settlement. Once initiated, de-escalation tends to proceed slowly and requires much effort. Many small steps must be taken before more significant de-escalation strategies can be initiated. This essay will outline various methods intended to limit escalation and promote de-escalation.
Slowing Escalation
Additional insights into limiting escalation/de-escalation are offered by several Beyond Intractability project participants.
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One way to avoid the dangers associated with escalation is to limit the extent to which a conflict becomes more intense and severe. Relationships that do not escalate easily are said to be high in stability. Various factors contribute to stability and make some conflicts resistant to escalation.
- First, conflict-limiting norms and institutions can limit the severity of conflict.[3] These norms and institutions typically prohibit the use of harsh tactics and point to problem solving as the appropriate way to respond to conflict. Such expectations act as "ceilings on normal behavior as do rules of any competition."[4]
- Forums and third-party institutions (mediation and arbitration, for example) help people resolve conflict peacefully rather than appealing to violence.[5]
- In addition, the fear of escalation can be important in limiting the extent to which conflict escalates out of control. Indeed, conflict is less likely to spiral when people are aware of the potential for such spirals and concerned about the consequences of escalation.[6] At the start of conflict, parties should set limits on how far they will go. They can agree to "cut losses" if the struggle escalates too far, or avoid entering struggles in which entrapment seems likely.[7]
- In addition, both sides may make efforts to ensure that conflict does not escalate inadvertently. For example, they can use active listening to make sure they don't escalate a dispute that is based on a simple misunderstanding. They may also utilize escalation-limiting language to ensure that any statements made about their grievances are not unnecessarily provocative.
- The establishment of social bonds tends to discourage the use of harsh tactics and reduce the likelihood of escalation. Such bonds include positive attitudes, respect, friendship, kinships, perceived similarity and common group membership.[8] These bonds can counteract any antagonism that arises over the course of conflict. The recognition that one's opponent is a member of a group to which one also belongs produces positive sentiments. And many note that an effective way to combat polarization is to forge sentimental bonds between two groups by making them feel they are a part of the same larger group. Common membership in crosscutting groups produces "bonds of perceived similarity and common group identity between these individuals."[9] In the most general sense, this is a matter of recognizing the common humanity of one's opponents and including them in one's moral scope. This process of humanization makes it much more difficult to justify the use of heavy tactics or aggression, and is therefore a powerful tool in limiting escalation.
De-escalation
But what can be done when conflict has already reached a significantly high level of intensity? In these cases, parties must turn to de-escalation strategies to counteract the escalation process and move toward a reconciliation.
Conflict de-escalation refers to a decrease in the severity of the coercive means used and in the number of parties engaged in the struggle.[10] One or more dimensions of the conflict become less intense and the conflict begins to lessen in size. De-escalation can be directed away from intense animosity or toward increased cooperation.[11]
The shift from escalation to de-escalation is not a single event, but rather a process that advances in a broad step-by-step fashion and is produced by pressures that build over time.[12] This process includes trying to get adversaries to the negotiating table, forming agreements about peripheral issues, and moving toward resolution of the basic issues.[13] All of this is typically accompanied by a reduction in hostility and mistrust between the adversaries.
Fortunately, people in an escalated conflict can only do so much damage to each other, and for only so long.[14] In particularly destructive and protracted conflicts, de-escalation typically occurs after parties have reached a hurting stalemate. At this point, neither party can escalate the conflict further, but neither side can win.[15] Contentious tactics have failed, resources have been exhausted, and both sides have incurred high costs.[16] At this point, the adversaries are likely to realize that things must change and they begin to develop a new way of thinking about their conflict.[17] Once they realize that their current strategy cannot triumph (at least not with acceptable costs), they are likely to begin to pursue a more conciliatory approach. If they refuse to end the stalemate by yielding or withdrawing, they must work together to find a mutually acceptable way out.[18]
At this point, one side typically makes an important conciliatory gesture. Hostility decreases, the tendency to retaliate lessens, and the level of coerciveness declines.[19] Eventually adversaries may begin to confer benefits on each other and reward each other for cooperating.[20] All of these factors initiate the process of de-escalation.
Conditions that Encourage De-escalation
Some of the same processes that contribute to escalation also contribute, in different circumstances, to de-escalation. The processes of de-escalation occur within each adversary, in the relations between adversaries, and among parties in the social environment.[21] To a large extent, all of these de-escalation processes occur as a result of various changes in conflict conditions. These changed conditions produce a new context in which de-escalation policies are more likely to succeed.
Social-psychological and Organizational Changes
The process of de-escalation that takes place within each adversary includes various social-psychological changes and organizational developments. These processes help people to recognize their own responsibility for the conflict and to reframe the conflict so that a mutually beneficial solution seems possible.[22]
Social-psychological processes that can contribute to de-escalation include cognitive dissonance, entrapment, relationship building, and empathy. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that once people have made conciliatory moves towards an adversary, they tend to justify their actions. In an attempt to make their values consistent with their actual conduct, parties may devalue previously-sought goals.[23] If the actions are reciprocated and turn out to be beneficial, de-escalation becomes even more likely.
Like cognitive dissonance, entrapment often fosters escalation but can be controlled to help avoid escalation. Indeed, certain aspects of entrapment can contribute directly to de-escalation. Once adversaries have initiated conciliatory actions, entrapments may help to keep them on course. This is because de-escalatory actions have costs and involve an investment on the part of the adversaries. Parties may therefore find themselves yielding more than they had anticipated in order to behave consistently with past actions. To abandon de-escalation after investing so much would be to admit that their previous actions had been mistaken.[24]
Sympathy and empathy also contribute to de-escalation and help to sustain it. A person sympathizing with another is emotionally moved by that person's feelings. Empathy, on the other hand, stresses taking the role of the other, accurately perceiving the other's feelings and thoughts, and experiencing those feelings and thoughts "as if" they were one's own.[25] Those who sympathize or empathize with their adversaries are far less likely to inflict devastating harm on them. In addition, such feelings help to produce and support further de-escalatory policies.
Several organizational developments within one or more of the parties can also fuel de-escalation. First, the emergence of groups interested in cooperating with the adversary may lend legitimacy to dissent from hard-line policies. Constituencies for de-escalation often arise when parties' confidence in the justness and morality of their cause begins to wane.[26]
Also, as the costs of continuing the struggle grow, parties may become doubtful about the value of the goals sought and develop a general sense that the means being used are not achieving what is intended. The evident failure of past coercive strategies may lead them to consider an alternate approach.[29]
In conflicts between groups, if the majority regards the severe tactics used by one faction as unacceptable, this extreme faction may lose its support and legitimacy.[30] Alternative leadership that supports de-escalation and opposes hard-line policies may emerge, leading to changes in policy that create new opportunities for de-escalation. If more moderate representatives are involved in decision-making, there is likely to be more free discussion and a genuine consideration of alternatives.[31]
A depletion of resources can further contribute to de-escalation. Adversaries have limited amounts of manpower and strategic materials that they can invest in waging conflict. As these limited resources begin to diminish, a party's ability to engage in coercive action decreases.[32] This depletion of resources may eventually hinder aggressive action. Furthermore, parties may decide that accommodation is better than continuing the struggle and risking total destruction.
Once de-escalation has begun, various organizational developments can make it difficult to turn back. Leaders who have undertaken the first de-escalatory steps do not want to appear as if they've made a mistake. If large, public steps have been taken to de-escalate conflict, this new course may seem irreversible.[33]
Interactions Between Adversaries
The second broad class of de-escalation processes pertains to the interaction between adversaries. Just as the destructive ways in which adversaries interact can foster conflict escalation, other modes of interaction can contribute to de-escalation. Parties' willingness to participate in de-escalation negotiations often results from their recognition that they are interdependent and that their goals can be integrated.[34]
To begin the process of de-escalation, each side must first recognize and respect the other's rights and legitimate interests. Parties can work to reduce inaccurate perceptions, stereotypes and enemy images through training in workshops, personal therapy and reflection.[35] Changes in relationships can be fostered through reciprocity, issue containment and developing positive ties between adversaries.
- First, reciprocity in interaction can help conflicts to mutually de-escalate.
- If each side reacts at an equivalent level to the other, both sides can avoid acting in ways they think may provoke or invite harsher actions from the other side.[36]
- In addition, learning from experiences with the adversary can help parties to estimate how the other side will react. This reduces the likelihood of unintentional conflict escalation.
- Finally, adversaries who develop shared norms of interaction may be constrained in the degree to which they escalate conflict.
- Second, issue containment can help conflict from becoming all-encompassing. This can occur in a variety of ways.
- In some cases, an adversary may intentionally concentrate all of its energy on a specific goal.
- Also, parties who fail to attain their grand goals may find settling for what they can get to be the best option.
- Once the matters in contention can be broken down into sub-issues, some of these issues may appear easier to settle and trade-offs among them may seem possible.[37]
- Finally, inflammatory issues may be contained by the development of shared goals. For example, adversaries who believe that continued escalation poses the risk of mutual destruction may decide to work together to avoid such a result.
- Lastly, as members from each side develop ties and establish communication, they may facilitate de-escalation. These individuals serve as "quasi-mediators," conveying important information to the opposing sides and helping both groups to find a way to de-escalate conflict. They may also develop bonds with each other and form shared expectations about how future confrontations will be handled.[39]
Third Party Roles
The final broad class of de-escalation processes concerns the roles played by outside parties and the ways in which they relate to the adversaries to foster de-escalation. Third parties can be official or unofficial--friends, co-workers, neighbors, or family members often act as unofficial mediators or arbitrators. Parents, for example, frequently arbitrate sibling disputes; friends mediate for other friends; bosses mediate or arbitrate for employees. Professional mediators also can be hired to mediate family, workplace or community conflicts.
Educational Institutions and the Media
Finally, social education and the media play a significant role in the de-escalation of community and inter-group conflicts. Currently, education is highly ethnocentric and influenced by propaganda and inflammatory media. However, schools, communities and the media also have the potential to promote cooperation and foster pro-social behavior. For example, schools can design activities to increase children's ability to identify others' emotional responses and to take the perspective of another. Such empathy training fosters cooperation and mutual understanding. Education about nonviolent modes of conflict resolution is also crucial. More and more schools are instituting peer mediation and/or conflict resolution education as part of the core curriculum. Often children who have been trained to be peer mediators take their skills home and teach them to their parents, siblings, and friends--thereby spreading basic conflict resolution skills and attitudes beyond the confines of the school.
The media, including radio and television, also plays an important role in conflict escalation AND de-escalation. Although the media tends to focus on violence and fear, it doesn't have to. Rather, the media has great potential to show nonviolent ways to reduce tensions and to resolve conflict--to present positive role models, instead of just negative ones.
De-escalation Strategies
Various tactics can be used to initiate the de-escalation process:
- Opening a new channel of communication.
- Suspension of sanctions.
- Removal of extremist leadership.
- Public acknowledgement of some responsibility for the conflict.
- Recognition of the adversary's existence and legitimacy.
- Cessation of violent coercion.
- Participation in informal discussions about solutions.
-- Christopher Mitchell, in The Anatomy of De-escalation, p. 52
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There are many policies and strategies that various parties can pursue in order to de-escalate conflicts. In selecting an approach, an analysis of the current situation should be made. No single kind of de-escalating effort will work for every conflict in every situation. Instead, a wide range of alternative policies should be reviewed to ascertain which policies are likely to attain particular goals under various circumstances.[44] Which policies of de-escalation will prove to be most effective will depend in large part on the level of escalation that has been reached.
While conflict that has reached only a low level of escalation is usually the easiest and least costly to resolve, the will to do so is often low.[45] Because the seriousness of these conflicts typically goes unrecognized, disputants and intermediaries often do not act.
To avoid further escalation, parties should use non-provocative methods, such as negotiation or protest as opposed to threats or other coercive tactics. They should keep the issues in contention narrowly focused and isolated from other issues, and limit participation of other people. One way of doing this is to reduce or counter inflammatory rumors and establish rumor control mechanisms. For example, in periods of rioting or other racial disturbances, the Community Relations Service, an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, sometimes establishes rumor control centers to provide accurate information about what is going on. On call all of the time, they provide a phone number citizens can call to seek verification of stories they have heard.[46]
Intermediaries can attempt to limit conflict escalation by providing mediation, information gathering and consultation services. Peer mediators do this on the playground at school; ombudspersons do this in the workplace environment. [47] Long-term de-escalation policies include the development of crosscutting group ties, institutionalized conflict resolution procedures (such as dispute resolution systems), and the creation of shared identities. They also involve efforts aimed at improving the social, economic, and cultural way of life of the disadvantaged and marginalized members of society.
Such measures not only limit inadvertent escalation, but also aid in de-escalation. Gradual Reduction in Tension (GRIT), a term coined by Charles Osgood, refers to those strategies whereby mutual tension and fear can be interrupted and the de-escalation process begun through conciliatory moves. One of the parties announces and initiates a series of small cooperative moves, and invites the other side to reciprocate. These moves are continued whether or not there is immediate reciprocity.[48] If the opponent does respond positively, the first party can make a second concession, which sets a "peace spiral" in motion.
If the first initiative is ignored, on the other hand, it can be followed by a second or even a third attempt. These concessions should be designed to build trust and indicate a willingness to cooperate, but should not be terribly costly. These disarming moves help to break down parties' negative perceptions of each other and allow a step-by-step process of conflict de-escalation to begin. Although developed with international conflicts in mind, the same strategies apply for long-running, intense interpersonal conflicts. Escalated conflicts between parents and teens can be treated in the same way. A parent can loosen up controls on their wayward teen a bit, as a conciliator move, hoping that the gesture will be returned by more respect for the family rules. Eventually trust can be rebuilt between parent and child, even when it had become badly deteriorated before.
The Importance of Timing
Timing is a critical factor in de-escalation efforts. William Zartman coined the term "ripeness," to indicate when a conflict was ready for de-escalation and resolution. Parties may try to de-escalate when the time is wrong or fail to try when the time is right. If de-escalation is attempted at the wrong time, it is likely to fail. Once made and rejected, a de-escalation proposal might become tainted. While it may have succeeded had it been implemented at a more suitable time, it becomes less credible once rejected. In addition, failed attempts to de-escalate conflict may contribute to parties' view of the conflict as intractable.[57] Any other de-escalation efforts may come to be regarded as hopeless.
In addition, parties may fail to initiate de-escalation policies when the time is ripe. A chance to reach a beneficial outcome has been lost, and it is possible that conditions may not be right for that settlement again.[58] Furthermore, if parties have only limited time to reach an agreement, the failure to take full advantage of an opportunity may lead to a lengthy delay. This allows the conflict to persist and possibly escalate. Hostilities may become institutionalized, making de-escalation more difficult in the future.
Finally, parties can initiate de-escalation when the time is right, and yet still fail to achieve the full range of desired results. That has many reasons, which can be summarized by saying that intractable conflicts are entrenched, complex, and somewhat unpredictable. What will work to de-escalate one may not work for another. Yet disputants themselves as well as the parties must be willing to risk de-escalation at some point, or else the conflict, with all its destructive results, will go on indefinitely.
[1] Roger Hurwitz, "Up the Down Staircase: A Practical Theory of Conflict De-escalation," in Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 123.
[2] Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 210.
[3] Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 1st edition. (New York: Random House, 1986), 67.
[4] I.W. Zartman and J. Aurik, "Power Strategies in De-escalation" In Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, eds. Louis Kriesberg and S.J. Thorson, S.J. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 153.
[5] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit. 67.
[6] Ibid., 68.
[7] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 183.
[8] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit.69.
[9] Ibid., 78.
[10] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 181.
[11] Louis Kriesberg, "Introduction," in Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 3.
[12] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 190.
[13] Kriesberg, "Introduction," in Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, 3.
[14] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit. 126.
[15] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 195.
[16] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit. 127.
[17] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 217.
[18] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit. 131.
[19] Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 113.
[20] Christopher Mitchell, "The Anatomy of De-escalation," in Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure, Jeong, Ho-Won, ed. (Ashgate Publishing Co., 1999), 44.
[21] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 182.
[22] Ibid., 182.
[23] Ibid., 183.
[24] Ibid., 183.
[25] Ibid., 184.
[26] Ibid., 192.
[27] Bartos and Wehr, op. cit. 119.
[28] Ibid., 114.
[29] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 193.
[30] Ibid., 185.
[31] Ibid., 186.
[32] Ibid., 119.
[33] Ibid., 86.
[34] Pruitt and Rubin, op. cit. 156.
[35] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 184.
[36] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 187.
[37] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 189.
[38] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 198.
[39] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 189.
[40] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 196.
[41] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 190.
[42] Hamburg, 37.
[43] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 214.
[44] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 199.
[45] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 202.
[46] Interviews with Manuel Salinas and Silke Hansen, Community Relations Service Mediators. Interview Transcripts available at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil_rights/.
[47] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 203.
[48] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 211.
[49] "Step-by-Step De-escalation (GRIT)" [available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/grit.htm] International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict.
[50] Kriesberg, "Introduction," in Timing the De-escalation of Intractable Conflicts, 17.
[51] Pruitt and Rubin, 135.
[52] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 205.
[53] Hamburg, 31.
[54] Hamburg, 31.
[55] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 211.
[56] Hamburg, 38.
[57] Kriesberg, "Introduction," in Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, 20.
[58] Kriesberg, "Introduction," in Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, 21.
Use the following to cite this article:
Maiese, Michelle. "Limiting Escalation / De-escalation." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limiting_escalation/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Glaser, Tanya. "Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War -- Summary." Conflict Research Consortium, Conflict Research Consortium, 1998.
Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10593/.
This page offers a summary of the book, Beyond the Hotline, by William Ury. Ury examines ways to prevent or control international crises. Although Ury was particularly concerned with ways to avoid a nuclear crisis between the Cold War superpowers, his suggestions remain relevant today.
De-escalation.
Available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/de-esc.htm.
This page outlines various strategies for reducing the intensity of a conflict and provides links to online essays and examples of de-escalation.
"International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-U.S.S.R. and the Middle East Cases--Book Summary." University of Colorado: Conflict Research Consortium, 1900.
Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10334/.
This is a summary of International Conflict Resolution, by Louis Kriesberg. The book presents an analysis of international conflict de-escalation and negotiation by investigating Arab-Israeli and U.S.-USSR de-escalation efforts.
"Step-by-Step De-escalation (GRIT)." International Online Training Project on Intractable Conflict ,
Available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/grit.htm.
De-escalation is much more difficult to implement than is escalation. One strategy for starting a de-escalation spiral is what Charles Osgood called GRIT--graduated reciprocal reductions in tension. This involves one side making a small conciliatory gesture, which they hope is matched by a conciliatory response. If it is not, a second or third small gesture can be made to indicate one's interest and willingness to de-escalate the conflict. Once the opponent reciprocates, another slightly more important conciliatory step can be taken, and if that is matched, the pattern can be continued, resulting in a cycle of conciliation in place of the former cycle of escalation.
Jameson, Jessica K. "The Escalation and De-escalation of Intractable Conflict." Communicating War and Terror ,
Available at: Click here for more info.
This piece explores how to de-escalate conflicts that have reached the final stage of intractability. It outlines three broad levels of change and de-escalation.
Offline (Print) Sources
Ury, William L. Beyond the Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis. Nuclear Negotiation Project, March 1984.
Ury examines ways to prevent or control international crises and increase communication between conflicting parties. Although Ury was particularly concerned with ways to avoid a nuclear crisis during the Cold War, his suggestions remain relevant today. Click here for more info.
Kriesberg, Louis. Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, April 1, 1998.
This books discusses how conflict can be waged constructively at each stage of its course--from emergence, escalation, de-escalation, termination, and finally, to resolution. Kriesberg also explores the bases of social conflict, types of inducements, conflict strategies, and the contributions of intermediaries. Click here for more info.
Kriesberg, Louis. "De-escalating Conflict." In Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd Edition. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, November 2002. Pages: 190-233.
This chapter examines the processes of de-escalation. It discusses some changing conditions that can contribute to de-escalation and suggests policies by which this process can be sustained and forwarded.
Kriesberg, Louis. "De-escalating Conflicts." In Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, April 1, 1998. Pages: 181-222.
Chapter 7 describes the processes of de-escalation that occur within each adversary, in the relations between them, and in the larger social environment. The author outlines various social-psychological and organizational developments that foster de-escalation and describes numerous strategies to bring about changes in the ways adversaries interact. While some strategies will work from a low level of escalation, other strategies are most effective for conflicts that have reached a markedly high level of escalation. Click here for more info.
Bartos, Otomar J. and Paul Wehr. "Deescalation Due to Changing Conditions." In Using Conflict Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, January 1, 2002. Pages: 113-121.
In chapter 7, the authors suggest that conflicts tend to de-escalate after they have been in a state of equilibrium for a long time. They describe various conditions that contribute to de-escalation, including a decrease in conflict solidarity and the depletion of resources. These factors decrease a party?s ability to engage in coercive action and encourage them to conciliatory gestures to de-escalation.
Kriesberg, Louis. International Conflict Resolution : The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, May 1, 1992.
This book presents an analysis of international conflict de-escalation and negotiation by investigating Arab-Israeli and U.S.-USSR de-escalation efforts.
Click here for more info.
Kriesberg, Louis. "Introduction: Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors." In Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts. Edited by Thorson, Stuart J., ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
This introduction discusses the concepts of de-escalation and timing and outlines various de-escalation efforts that attempt to move parties toward formal negotiations and agreements. The author also outlines various conditions that are conducive to de-escalation, including aspects of adversary relations, domestic circumstances, and international context. Finally, he describes many of the different de-escalation strategies that are available to both outside actors and the parties themselves.
Kriesberg, Louis. "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability." In Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict. Edited by Dosi, Giovanni, ed. Washington D.C. : U.S. Institute of Peace, April 30, 2005.
The chapter reviews factors that contribute to intractibility at each stage of a conflict. In addition, it discusses steps that may be taken to reduce the sense of intractibility.
Elder, Joseph W. "Needed Sociological Research on the De-escalation of Wars." Sociological Forum (Special Issue: Needed Sociological Research on Issues of War and Peace) 7:1, March 1992.
This article distinguishes between three types of groups that engage in wars: states, insurgenets, and peoples. The author suggests that wars fought between different combinations of these three groups follow different patterns of de-escalation. He also raises questions regarding the dynamics of de-escalation processes, the roles of different participants, and various types of de-escalation strategies.
Zartman, I. William and Johannes Aurik. "Power Strategies in De-Escalation." In Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Edited by Kriesberg, Louis and Stuart J. Thorson, eds. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
This piece considers whether positive or negative inducements are more effective exercises of power to produce de-escalation. The authors present various cases studies and discuss them in light of the foregoing question. They maintain that the initial decision to de-escalate is usually brought about by failed escalation rather than constraints imposed by one's adversary. And while threats can motivate parties to move toward agreement, the provision of incentives is ultiamtely more conducive to long-term de-escalation.
Zartman, I. William, ed. Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation. Rowman & Littlefield, December 28, 2000.
This work examines the characteristics of preventive diplomacy, focusing on the fact that negotiation lies at the heart of the pursuit. The work reviews how preventive negotiation has been practiced by looking at specific issues to which the practice has been applied. Eleven different authors contribute essays on topics including "boundary problems, territorial claims, ethnic conflict, divided states, state disintegration, cooperative disputes, trade wars, transboundary environmental disputes, global natural disasters, global security conflicts, and labor disputes. The editor's conclusion draws out general themes about the nature of preventive diplomacy."
-Amazon.com
Pruitt, Dean G., Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Sung Hee Kim. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd Edition. New York: McGraw Hill College Division, January 1, 1994.
This work explores the dynamics of conflict escalation, focusing on tactical considerations of conflict strategies and their potential outcomes. Click here for more info.
Pruitt, Dean G., Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Sung Hee Kim. "Stalemate and De-escalation." In Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd Edition. New York: McGraw Hill College Division, January 1, 1994. Pages: 150-167.
This chapter explains why stalemates occur and describes how parties move from stalemate to de-escalation. Stalemates emerge for a variety of reasons, including exhaustion of resources unwillingness to incur continued costs. One way for parties to move out of stalemate and into de-escalation is through problem-solving. In this chapter, the authors stress the role that increased communication and the development of superordinate goals can play in moving adversaries toward problem-solving and de-escalation. Click here for more info.
Mitchell, Christopher R. "The Anatomy of De-Escalation." In Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure. Edited by Jeong, Ho-Won, ed. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999.
There is a question as to whether de-escalation is simply escalation in reverse, or a different sort of process altogether. The author distinguishes between positive and negative modes of de-escalation and suggests that de-escalation thresholds are likely to be very different from those involved in escalation. This chapter explains why de-escalation is not simply a reversal of the escalation process and outlines some distinctive features of de-escalation.
Hurwitz, Roger. "Up the Down Staircase: A Practical Theory of De-escalation." In Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts. Edited by Kriesberg, Louis, ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
Full de-escalation from war to peaceful cooperation involves a series of successive redefinitions of the adversaries' relationship. First, each party realizes that it can impose terrible burdens on the other and that the other also knows this. Second, the adversaries realize that they can both benefit from mutual self-restraint. Finally, the former antagonists begin to see themselves as partners in producing a commonly desired state of affairs and are concerned for one another's well-being. The author describes various conditions that make such transformation possible.
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Online (Web) Sources
Sawhny, Karan R. and Nidhi Narain. Pakistan: Fratricidal Conflict Between Pakistan's Shias and Sunnis.
Available at: http://www.conflict-prevention.net/.
This article profiles the intractable conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, and the steps the Musharraf administration has taken to de-escalate it and prevent further polarization.
Lakicevic, Dragan, Maria Teresa Mauro and Zoran Lutovac. "Serbia: A New Beginning Taking Shape." , 2002
Available at: Click here for more info.
This article examines security challenges in ethnically hetereogeneous regions of Serbia in the difficult aftermath of the Milosevic era. The article discusses how the international community and NGOs are working to ease ethnic tensions in the region.
Offline (Print) Sources
Fitzduff, Mari. Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Processes in Northern Ireland. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2002.
In this book, author Mari Fitzduff discusses the various conflict resolution processes that helped bring de-escalation to the conflict in North Ireland. This work provides an outline of the conflict itself as well as outlining conflict initiatives in the fields of equality, diversity, security work, and political and community dialogue. While emphasizing the complexity of resolving a conflict such as that in Northern Ireland, the nature of the resolution processes employed highlights the importance of addressing social-psychological aspects of the conflict. Click here for more info.
Kriesberg, Louis. International Conflict Resolution : The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, May 1, 1992.
This book presents an analysis of international conflict de-escalation and negotiation by investigating Arab-Israeli and U.S.-USSR de-escalation efforts.
Click here for more info.
Rasler, Karen. "Shocks, Expectancy Revision, and the De-escalation of Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case." Journal of Peace Research 37:6, November 1, 2000.
"This article introduces an evolutionary framework for the de-escalation of protracted conflicts. Key variables are political shocks, expectancy revision, policy entrepreneurship, third-party pressure, and reciprocity. The model is tested in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian case, 1979-98." --Sage Publications Click here for more info.
George, Alexander L. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." In Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991. Pages: 31-37.
George argues that three factors contributed to Kennedy's success in preventing escalation. First, he limited his demands to removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Further demands would have only provoked greater Soviet resistance. Second, Kennedy began with a blockade, which did not involve the immediate use of force and bought him time to attempt to persuade the Soviets. Finally, both Khrushchev and Kennedy followed important operational principles of crisis management.
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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
War and Peace in Ireland . Directed and/or Produced by: MacCaig, Arthur. First Run Icarus Films. 1998.
This film chronicles the conflict in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998. It shows the actions that were taken to de-escalate the conflict after years of prolonged violence. Click here for more info.
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