Ceasefire


By
M. Shane Smith


October 2003
 

What is a Ceasefire and Why is it Important?



© Reprinted from http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/cease.html with permission of The Pedagogic Center, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish Agency for Israel

A ceasefire is a temporary cessation of violence that does not settle the larger conflict but is intended as a step in that direction. It is one of the first and necessary steps in a peace process aimed at transforming or settling a violent conflict. Its declaration alters the political landscape by providing a cooling-off period that paves the way for negotiation of issues that cannot be addressed during times of hostilities. Violence breeds anxiety, fear, and enmity that generally preclude negotiation and any hopes for a peaceful solution to underlying disputes. Instead, continued violence, with its associated bloodshed, encourages each side to pursue unilateral strategies that seek to destroy one's opponent outright or disable them as a viable force of social/organizational opposition.[1] To overcome the polarizing effects of violence, there may be a mutual or unilateral ceasefire declaration. However, unless there is strong political commitment and concerted leadership towards an envisioned peaceful end, such declarations are fragile and likely to breakdown in the first few months.[2]

Problems and Prospects



Mari Fitzduff talks about her experiences in Northern Ireland and covers everything from peacebuilding to paramilitaries.

The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict illustrates the frailty of such agreements. While the Israeli government maintains sole legitimate control of its use of force, radical segments of Israeli society have had a significant ability to aggravate the conflict even when the majority of the population, and the government's official policy, have sought a cease fire and negotiation with the Palestinians. For instance, a member of an extremist anti-Arab movement assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, a moderate Israeli leader who sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the mid-1990s, precisely because Rabin was willing to negotiate and perhaps make concessions to the Palestinians. Since then, the Israeli government has been led by hard-line and, arguably, antagonistic elements less-willing to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, there are multiple factions vying for power within Palestinian society, each with its own aims and interests. The Palestinian Authority has found controlling and incorporating the more radical groups, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, extremely difficult. The result, especially when negotiations do not reflect the interests of extremist groups, seems to be waves of suicide bombings against Israeli citizens in an unambiguous attempt to disrupt the resumption of a ceasefire and peace process. Indeed, the most fanatical factions on both sides rely on conflict to justify their continuation as a social entity and, therefore, would rather prolong violence than relinquish their aims (often entailing the wholesale destruction of the other side). In turn, ceasefires between the two have been short-lived, as violence erupts and increasingly polarizes the two societies.

Any ceasefire can be tenuous because tensions and skepticism remain high. If one side lacks the sincere intention of pursuing a negotiated settlement, the whole process is jeopardized. Moreover, ceasefires are often manipulated as tools for political or strategic advantage. For instance, one side may use a ceasefire to reconstitute its war-fighting capacity and/or maneuver its forces into stronger tactical positions. One side may also undertake other provocative actions that are not in-line with the spirit of the ceasefire in an effort to weaken the position of its opponent, perhaps inciting the other side to break the ceasefire, bringing condemnation and pressures from third parties.



Mari Fitzduff suggests that cease fire agreements and peace processes take a long time to develop.

Thus, a successful ceasefire often requires a baseline of trust among adversaries. This takes the form of a psychological transformation, such as the realization that continued violence is self-destructive, the recognition of one's own role in the creation of the conflict or empathy for one's enemy.[3] However, the most difficult aspect of managing a ceasefire is the ability to gain the support of all stakeholders to a conflict or at least to ensure that actions taken by those with a minority view to disrupt negotiations do not lead to a breakdown of the ceasefire.

Once enacted, ceasefires do have their own momentum. Civilian hopes of a peaceful resolution to an on-going conflict become inflated within warring societies, driving up the political costs of breaking the ceasefire. Moreover, ceasefires shift domestic political coalitions and generate new institutional interests in maintaining peaceful relations, even if simultaneous interests and coalitions opposing the ceasefire are generated. Pressure from third parties able to reward or sanction parties to an agreement can provide added assurances of and further highlight parties' interests in maintaining a truce. Indeed, ceasefires have increasingly been accompanied by the introduction of peacekeepers who monitor the agreements and provide a buffer zone between adversaries that helps alleviate anxieties and the potential for renewed violence. Indeed, the introduction of third parties is often a requisite for a ceasefire. For instance, Liberian president, Charles Taylor, in a ceasefire agreement signed with rebel forces, agreed to leave office if international peacekeepers (specifically troops from the United States) arrived to oversee the agreement and help maintain stability. Once third parties are introduced into a peace process, they have an interest in seeing it through and, therefore, provide additional resources and momentum to ceasefire agendas.

Conclusion

Ceasefires are inherently unstable. They are only implemented after hostilities have generated a great deal of enmity and distrust. Once a conflict has widened to incorporate numerous parties, the parties inevitably have differing interests. Some (who Guy and Heidi Burgess call "conflict profiteers") benefit from the conflict itself and hence seek to prolong it.[4] Other "hardliners" may seek escalation of the conflict and even aim for the total destruction of the opponent. Ensuring that these factions abide by or have minimal impact on ceasefire agreements is a difficult task for any governing body, particularly one attempting to gain acquiescence to proposed agreements while hostilities are still underway. Third parties can be valuable in helping to highlight the benefits of ceasefire agreements and assuage fears that bolster the arguments of ceasefire opponents. However, instituting ceasefire agreements also has dangers: they may be manipulated by one or all sides in a conflict; freeze, and thus legitimize, power and resource inequities between adversaries and within their respective constituencies; and, by allowing time for warring parties to reconstitute their forces, possibly set the stage for a more destructive conflict in the future.


[1] For non-negotiated paths to conflict settlement, see Louis Kreisberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd Edition (Boulder: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), pp. 275-277.

[2] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, "Conclusion: Peace Processes, Present and Future," in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes ( London: Palgrave Macmillan, Ltd., 2003), p. 265.

[3] Kreisberg, pp. 191-94.

[4] "Conflict Profiteers" essay in the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base.


Use the following to cite this article:
Smith, M. Shane. "Ceasefire." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cease-fire/>.

Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic

Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:

Offline (Print) Sources

Bailey, Sydney D. "Cease-fires, Truces, Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council." The American Journal of International Law 71:3, July 1977.
This older article discusses the history of the terms truce, armistice, and cease-fire, as employed by the United Nations Security Council over the past several decades. Through analysis of key events in the history of the Security Council, the author fleshes out the distinctions between the terms/concepts.

Smith, James D. D. Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire, Reprint Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, November 1997.
"No war ends without a cease-fire. This is the first book-length attempt to catalog the reasons why some wars are so difficult to stop -- even when both sides want the fighting to end. Through in-depth case studies, James Smith assesses the obstacles and points toward solutions for ending wars more quickly." -From Publisher

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Examples Illustrating this Topic:

Online (Web) Sources

Agreement of Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954.
Available at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc.htm.
This page presents the text of the 194 Geneva Agreements that theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. This agreement established provisional military demarcation line and demilitarized zone on either side of the line. In the 1960s, the Vietnam DMZ became a strategically significant region in the conflict between U.S. and Viet-Kong forces.

Sapone, Montgomery. "Ceasefire: The Impact of Republican Political Culture on the Ceasefire Process in Northern Ireland." , May 2000
Available at:
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/SAPONE71PCS.html.

This article argues that the duration of the conflict in Northern Ireland cannot be understood without reference to Irish Republican culture and history. Similarly, the ceasefire itself must be viewed in light of the history and culture of Irish Republicanism.

"Chronology of War and Peace in the Philippines." Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS), 1900.
Available at:
http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf.

This article examines peace negotiations, coup attempts, and cease-fires that took place in the Philippines between 1945 and 1998. It also looks at the beginnings of Islam in the Philippines, and the rise of militant Islamic groups.

Uidhir, Sean Mag. "Creation of a Framework for Negotiations: A Leap into Uncharted Waters." Accord, Vol. 8 , December 1999
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This article discusses the process of negotiation between the IRA and the Republican party in Northern Ireland that resulted in the cessation of military operations by the IRA in 1994. The article then goes on to discuss reasons for the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire and the subsequent strategy adjustments made by the Republicans and the IRA, in an effort toward achieving a peace settlement.

Tapi, Robert. "From Burnham to Buin: Sowing the Seeds of Peace in the Land of the Snow-Capped Mountains." Accord, Vol. 12: Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville Peace Process , August 2002
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This article discusses the Burnham Peace Talks between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville in 1997. They brought the first successful ceasefire to the area in more than a decade. The reasons for the success, as well as detailed descriptions of the talks are covered.

International Peacebuilding Interventions: Reflections on the Truce Monitoring Group.
Available at:
Click here for more info.
This article discusses the Truce Monitoring Group established to help Bougainville and Papua New Guinea maintain their cease-fire.

"Lome Agreement Summary." Accord, Vol. 9 , September 2000
Available at:
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/lome-summary.php.

This page lists the requirements of Sierra Leone's cease-fire, known as the Lome agreement. The summary describes the various aspects of the agreement including power-sharing terms, reconciliation stages, constitutional provisions, military stipulations, human rights provisions, and the implementation agenda.

Recent Peace Agreements and Cease-Fires.
Available at:
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/metadata/agreement.html.
This is an extensive list of recent peace accords and cease-fires arising from protracted ethnic conflicts around the world. They reveal that despite the headlines of intractable ethnic conflicts, many efforts are being made to manage ethnic conflicts more effectively.

Danilov, Dmitrii. "Russia's Role (in the Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process)." Accord, Vol. 7 , September 1999
Available at:
Click here for more info.

Scroll down the page to locate "Russia's Role." The article discusses and attempts to address a set of questions regarding the various roles Russia has played in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and peace process. The author explains that in spite of conflicting perceptions of its conduct during the war, Russia was instrumental in establishing the ceasefire that has lasted since 1994. However, the author asks whether Russia's actions have really been entirely helpful.

Barnes, Harry and Gary Kent. "The Creation of a Framework for Negotiations: Ceasefires and Elections." Accord, Vol. 8 , December 1999
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This article discusses the mid-1990's negotiations surrounding the issue of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons in Northern Ireland. The discussion covers the actions of the involved political parties and the principles developed by the Independent Body on Decommissioning, which helped provide a foundation for peace talks.

Offline (Print) Sources

Sharp, Jane M.O. "Dayton Report Card." International Security 22:3, 1997.
This article outlines and critiques the provisions of the 1995 Dayton Accords, which codified a cease-fire in the war in Bosnia and was intended to bring sable peace to the region.

Howe, Herbert. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping." International Security 21:3, 1996.
This article details the turbulent attempt by Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) ECOMOG to establish a ceasefire in Liberia after warring factions signed an agreement in August 1995. The piece provides background on the roots of the Liberian conflict and proceeds to examine the possible effectiveness of subregional military groupings by analyzing the work of ECOMOG in the Liberian conflict of 1989-1996.

Rowan, Brian. "The Armed Peace: Life and Death After the Ceasefires." , October 2003.
This work details events in Northern Ireland since a cease-fire agreement was reached in 1994. The author examines the ongoing power struggles between the parties as well as the potential for renewed violence. Click here for more info.

The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, November 1, 2001.
Achieving sustainable peace after civil conflict can be a challenge. As Darby reports, 31 of 38 formal peace accords signed from 1988-1998 failed to last more than three years. Dissecting four stages of peace processes (prenegotiation, cease-fire, negotiating a political settlement, and postsettlement peacebuilding), Darby examines the impact of violence at each point. Click here for more info.

Adeleke, Ademola. "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia." Journal of Modern African Studies 33:4, December 1995.
This article examines the ways in which member states of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) dealt with the organization's shift from an economic development organization to one that also works to resolve conflict and establish peace in West African hot spots. The piece concentrates on the situation in Liberia in the early 1990s, analyzing how the dynamics of intra-regional politics and diplomacy, as well as ethnicity, affected the peace process in that nation. The concluding section assesses the potential for employing the ECOWAS operation as a model for conflict resolution in Africa.

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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:

Online (Web) Sources

The Mideast: A Century of ConflictPart 6: From the First Intifada to the Oslo Peace Agreement. NPR. October 7, 2002.
Available at:
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/mideast/history/history6.html.

This audio clip discusses the beginning of the first Intifada and Israel's government being divided between the right-wing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party (who eventually favored negotiations with the Palestinians). As the Intifada continued Israelis decided that it was time to settle with the Palestinians. In 1992, Prime Minister Rabin authorized secret negotiations with the PLO in Oslo. The Israelis and the Palestinians signed the Oslo peace agreement in 1993.

Offline (Print) Sources

War and Peace in Ireland . Directed and/or Produced by: MacCaig, Arthur. First Run Icarus Films. 1998.
This film follows the conflict in Northern Ireland through its different stages. It gives a picture of how violence escalated during the 1960s, how negotiations helped ease the violence in the 1980s, and how cease fires in the 1990s brought with them the prospect of peace. Click here for more info.

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