External Supporters


By
Michelle Maiese


July 2004
 


The "anti-apartheid movement" was a coalition that encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local bodies. It developed a broad range of actions from public boycotts to UN sanctions, from the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees to military and non-military assistance to the liberation movement. This broad coalition of external supporters played a crucial role in liberating South Africa from apartheid. Available here

The Role of External Supporters

Once an overt struggle has begun, parties not initially engaged may believe there is something to be gained by providing support for either side. This leads states and organizations to become involved in a conflict on behalf of one of the parties already involved. These outside actors are what we call "external supporters."

Protagonists in a fight are seldom isolated. Each has potential allies and enemies that may join the struggle. Disputants seeking assistance from others not yet involved in the conflict may try to portray their actions in a positive light, so as to win over supporters and dissuade external actors from supporting their adversaries.[1] The may also choose strategies and tactics that are likely to generate sympathy and support of potential allies and avoid other tactics which might drive uninvolved parties to the side of their opponent.

Motivations of External Supporters



Richard Rubenstein talks about the role of external actors in helping parties to get out of a hurting stalemate

External supporters may motivated by a variety of concerns For example, a supporter may wish to inflict harm and weaken an old foe or win a portion of the spoils that a war victory might bring. A party might lend its support out of an obligation to support its friends or allies, or out of a sense of commonality with one of the sides. For example, American Jews often support Israel, while American Arabs support the Palestinians.

In other cases, the conflict strategies being used may seem so offensive to external actors that they join the struggle to stop these outrageous acts from occurring. (For example, NATO intervened in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts because members were outraged at the "ethnic cleansing" taking place.) Alternatively, the actions of one side may seem so admirable that supporters and allies rally to join the cause.

Ethnic groups struggling for autonomy or independence often gain support from members of that same ethnic group in other countries. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, the PLO organized and supported opposition activity by Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel's Occupied Territories. Similarly, indigenous rights organizations have promoted the establishment of numerous indigenous peoples' movements, provided strategic guidance for their leaders, and pressured governments to respond positively.[2]

Types of Support

The support provided by states and organizations includes financial and military resources, political backing, and moral support. The provision of funds or weapons is meant to provide power to one of the opposing sides and enable its combatants to wage their struggle more effectively. If the other side realizes that it cannot win, such external support may result in an earlier settlement.

Support may also come in the form of sanctions against one's opponent. For example, external actors in support of dismantling the system of apartheid made use of economic sanctions to apply pressure for change in South Africa. [3]. Though it took a long time, the majority white ruling party in South Africa finally realized it could not sustain the struggle against the whole world's negative opinion, and it consequently opened negotiations to end apartheid.

Is Their Role Constructive or Destructive?

External support can be either constructive or destructive depending on the situation and how it is used. If external support equalizes the power in the conflict, the parties may realize that neither can win without enormous costs, and thus agree to negotiate a settlement.(This situation is referred to as "ripeness.") External supporters might then provide resources to help attain a settlement, or to implement one once it is reached. (For example, external supporters of the Palestinians offered a substantial amount of aid to help the fledgling Palestinian state in the Oslo Accords, though this offer was not enough to induce the Palestinians to accept that agreement.)


America's "strategic cooperation" with Israel centers around two types of military related assistance: Economic Support Funds and Foreign Military Financing. These sources are intended to help Israel finance its acquisition of U.S. military equipment, services, and training.  Some suggest that by arming Israel in preparation for further conflict, the U.S. may acutally be hindering the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Available here.

However, external support also makes it possible that conflicts will be protracted, deadly, and highly resistant to settlement.[4]. If the balance of power between adversaries is equalized, yet neither is willing to admit that they cannot prevail (in other words, that they have reached a "hurting stalemate,") then the conflict is likely to continue longer with the additional aid. In addition, such wars are not likely to end in negotiated settlements unless and until it is in the interest of the external powers. Consequences tend to be particularly tragic in cases where competing powers support different sides in conflict. For example, many local conflicts in Africa, Central America, Asia and the Middle East were sustained and exacerbated during the Cold War as a result of the assistance granted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to opposing sides. [5] As a result, it is sometimes the withdrawal of external support that opens possibilities for settlement.


[1] Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd edition, 172.

[2] Ted Gurr, "Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century" in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 177.

[3] Peter Gastrow, "A Joint Effort: The South African Peace Process" http://www.xs4all.nl/~conflic1/pbp/part1/8_joint_.htm

[4] Ted Gurr, 178.

[5] Kriesberg, 168.


Use the following to cite this article:
Maiese, Michelle. "External Supporters." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2004 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/external_supporters/>.

Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic

Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:

Online (Web) Sources

Gastrow, Peter. "A Joint Effort: The South African Peace Process." ,
Available at:
http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/8_joint_.htm.

External actors made use of economic sanctions to apply pressure for change in South Africa.

Peacemaking: Diplomacy.
Available at:
Click here for more info.
Diplomacy is crucial to the peacemaking process. This essay examines Track I diplomacy, Third parties - Track I, Track II diplomacy, and Third Parties - Track II.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement: A Forty Year Perspective.
Available at:
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/symposium.html.
"The "anti-apartheid movement" was a coalition that encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local bodies. It developed a broad range of actions from public boycotts to UN sanctions, from the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees to military and non-military assistance to the liberation movement. This broad coalition of external supporters played a crucial role in liberating South Africa from apartheid."

Ackerman, Peter and Christopher Kruegler. The Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict.
Available at:
http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10005/.

Ackerman and Kruegler suggest twelve principles of strategic action. Each principle addresses a factor in the success or failure of strategic nonviolent conflict. The authors note that adhering to these principles may increase the likelihood of success, but cannot guarantee it. They also expect these principles to undergo revision and refinement as our understanding of strategies of nonviolence grows.

Yackley, Joseph. "U.S. Security Assistance to Israel." ,
Available at:
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n23israelsec.html.

The key points of this article are: The U.S. should not undermine the peace process that it has helped design by arming Israel in preparation for further conflict; Increases in U.S. military assistance are based on the unreasonable claim that Israel grows less secure with each peace treaty it signs; the U.S. should adjust its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by seeking innovative ways of addressing the causes of conflict.

Offline (Print) Sources

Kriesberg, Louis. Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd Edition. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, November 2002.
This volume discusses the catalysts and phases of conflict as well as the processes of conflict resolution. It identifies the complexities of constructive conflicts and outlines case studies of intractable conflict moving towards resolution.

Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century. This article presents a survey of the current evidence and analyses of ethnopolitical conflicts around the world. These conflicts are engaged in by groups who define themselves using ethnic or national criteria and make claims against the state or other political actors, regarding their collective interests (ie. Mayans of Chiapas, Bosnian Serbs).

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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:

Offline (Print) Sources

Democracy in Crisis. Directed and/or Produced by: Datta, Manjira. First Run Icarus Films. 1991.
This film lays out the different political, religious, ethnic, and class factions, as well as their backers, who are embroiled in Indian communal conflicts. Click here for more info.

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