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Sanctions are often viewed as an alternative to military force. By punishing an offending party economically, socially, or politically, rather than militarily, those who impose sanctions hope to solve a conflict without the mass suffering and sacrifice required by war. Indeed, sanctions have sometimes been effective, and are widely used. But their use is much more common than their success: studies indicate that only five to, at most, 30 percent of sanctions result in the desired change.[1] [2] The use of sanctions also comes with significant risks. In this essay, I will examine the history and uses of sanctions, some associated problems, and how sanctions can be made more effective instruments of policy.
What are sanctions?
William Ury describes the role of the equalizer in intractable conflicts. Equalizers build up the power of the low power group to enable them to be able to negotiate fairly with the other side. This can be done through violence, but it is also very effectively done with nonviolence. Mobilizing world public opinion is especially important and effective now as the globe is shrinking socially, politically, and economically.
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Sanctions involve one party attempting to change another party's behavior without the use of weapons or the military. Sanctions range from travel bans and arms embargoes, to complete trade bans. Sanctions often have uncertain and irreversible consequences and can cause great human suffering. However, they have also been successful in changing opponents' behavior. Sanctions and threats of sanctions have been credited with curbing human-rights violations, ousting belligerent leaders, and limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The perception of doing something to punish a corrupt international government can be a powerful domestic incentive for leaders to implement sanctions. For instance, anti-Castro exiles in the United States have applied significant political pressure on American leaders to retain and even increase sanctions on Cuba.
History of Sanctions
Sanctions have been a tool of economic statecraft for thousands of years. Pericles, a statesman in Athens in the 5th century B.C. ordered all trade banned between the Athenian Empire and Megra, a city-state that had sided with Sparta, Athens' enemy. He intended to send the message that, short of going to war, Athens would punish anyone who challenged her authority. These sanctions ultimately lead to a thirty-year war. [3]
For most of the 20th century, sanctions were rarely used. During the Cold War, both the U.S.S.R. and the United States tried to gain a competitive edge over each other by cooperating with corrupt leaders. This policy made sanctions an ineffective tool. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were only two U.N.-approved sanctions, against Rhodesia and South Africa.
After the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council ordered sanctions against a number of countries, Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, and others. Their violations include external and internal aggression, support of terrorism, and suppression of democracy.[4] Also during this time, the United States rose to unprecedented international power, giving greater authority to its unilateral sanctions. The United States' economic strength, combined with a reluctance to deploy its military force to address economic, moral, or political problems resulted in a sharp increase in unilateral sanctions. In 1998, one commentator estimated that "two-thirds of the world's population [was] subject to some sort of US sanctions."[5] However, the United States has not been the only nation to employ economic sanctions. In addition to thousands of single-nation bans and proposals, the increasingly viable European Union has been sponsoring its own brand of sanctions.
Examples of success
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 disintegrated in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, after a bomb ripped a hole in its fuselage. The Qaddafi regime of Libya was accused of the attack and of harboring two suspects, Amin Fhimah and Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. Led by the United States, the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions that threatened international sanctions including military embargoes and prohibiting the sale of industrial equipment to Libya unless it handed over the suspects. Qaddafi resisted for years, but in 1999 succumbed to global pressures. The trial found al-Megrahi guilty of the murders, while his colleague was acquitted. Other examples of the effective use of sanctions include South Africa where it is thought that international sanctions isolated the government and helped bring its policies of apartheid to an overdue end. Similarly, global sanctions placed on Serbia, after Slobodan Milosevic's cruel campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, helped bring about Milosevic's downfall and subsequent extradition to face an international war crimes tribunal.
Shortfalls of Sanctions
Sanctions may have unintended consequences. Alexander George discusses the potential "boomerang effect" of "coercive diplomacy"[6] when he suggests that Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent entry of the United States into World War II, stemmed from economic sanctions:
"The oil embargo the United States imposed on Japan in July 1941 was so credible and so potent that it quickly provoked Japanese leaders into making a very difficult and desperate decision to initiate war rather than capitulate to Washington's extreme demands that it get out of China and, in effect, give up its aspirations for regional hegemony in Southeast Asia."[7]
Similarly, Louis Kreisberg suggests that sanctions can "widen the conflict, add to its destructiveness, and sometimes prolong it."[8]
Sanctions are also destructive to the targeted societies. A 1999 study suggests that post-Cold War sanctions may have contributed to more deaths than all "weapons of mass destruction" used throughout history.[9] In Iraq, for instance, it is has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of children died between 1991 and 2001, in part as a result of sanctions.[10] Such effects weaken the political support necessary for effective trade bans. In Iraq's case, there were significant fluctuations in international support for the decade-long sanctions.
Another problem with sanctions is that threats cost more when they fail because the sender must follow through with a punishment. A larger threat is likely to be cheaper, because it is less likely to fail. To reduce potential costs, a sender may build up a threatened punishment, thinking that otherwise it will fail. As a result, senders may overdo the level of threat needed for a situation.
Additionally, threats inherently cause stress and can affect one's rationality or problem-solving capacity. They can also generate resistance. There is a difference between opposition to an outside attempt to influence and opposition generated by the attempt to influence. Often, the target would rather face a threat than be perceived as weak by giving in to a threat. Sanctions convey a message of indifference and hostility. Furthermore, when senders impose sanctions on a target, the target is much more likely to impose sanctions on the sender when given the chance.
Finally, if there is domestic support for the targeted leader, sanctions may generate a "rally around the flag" or nationalist response, in which a population under threat unites around its leaders.[11] Rather than having a pacifying effect on the targeted actor, sanctions then strengthen a leader's domestic support. Outside pressure can also be used by leaders to ignore domestic troubles, placing the blame for economic instability on the outsider, and providing political cover to further repress domestic dissidents, while directing resentment toward those who impose the sanctions.
Some scholars, such as Daniel Fisk, conclude that "economic sanctions are a policy instrument with little, if any, chance of achieving much beyond making policy-makers feel good about having done something for a particular domestic community."[12]
Making sanctions more effective
Rather than simply dismissing sanctions as a destructive weapon of the strong, most analysts argue that they are viable, but imperfect, tools of foreign policy. They suggest ways of structuring and monitoring sanctions to enhance their impact on the targeted actor and to minimize their destructive effects. Specifically, sanctions are more likely to have a positive influence if:
- there is multilateral coordination,
- the targeted government faces domestic opposition, and
- sanctions are combined with incentives.
International Cooperation
Effective sanctions require multilateral coordination or, if used unilaterally, a rare monopoly on the sanctioned commodities. If the targeted actor is able to acquire sanctioned goods elsewhere, then the sanction is little more than a nuisance and has little, if any, potential as a corrective measure. Rather, it is more likely to escalate the conflict. While the United States and sometimes the European Union can weaken other countries, without international cooperation there is little chance of success. The resilience of the governments in Cuba and Vietnam, despite decades of U.S. sanctions, shows that unilateral action may not achieve the intended end. This is largely because, as Eileen Crumm argues, market forces work against multilateral sanctions, making them an inherently difficult instrument of foreign policy.[13] When a commodity becomes scarce due to sanctions, economic forces of supply and demand drive up its value. The economic incentive for others to ignore the sanctions increases. Countries attempt to corner the market by "getting there first and with the most," gaining an advantage before others have a chance to enter the market, which can happen if one nation enforces a trade ban but another does not.[14] This discourages cooperation and renders unilateral sanctions largely ineffective.
Domestic Opposition
Sanctions are most likely to be effective when targeted leaders are faced with domestic instability. Domestic weaknesses lessen the ability for leaders to play the nationalist card, rallying support against external threats. They also decrease their ability to organize internal structures in order to shield themselves from sanctions.
Sanctioned leaders often must acquiesce to external pressure in order to avoid domestic instability. However, when they defer to outsiders, they risk weakening their political standing and encouraging the future use of sanctions against them. They also may encourage external and internal forces to feed off and reinforce one another. This was the case in South Africa, where international pressure and domestic unrest grew, reinforcing each other, until the apartheid regime buckled.
Incentives: An alternative to sanctions
Many experts argue that incentives should be combined with or used as an alternative to sanctions. Doing so, they argue, enhances the chance of avoiding violent conflict and reaching a political goal. David Baldwin draws on behavioral psychology when he argues that threats send a message of hostility and are met with anxiety, fear, and resentment, whereas incentives can send a message of hope, cooperation, and goodwill.[15] While incentives may be resented if viewed as a bribe, or as overshadowed by a threatened or imposed sanction, they are less likely to provoke obstinate behavior. Moreover, they can be combined with sanctions in an effort to divide domestic support for objectionable policies. When specific sectors of society are isolated as targets of sanctions, incentives can alleviate the potential for a "rallying" effect and can increase support for change in other parts of society, by offering potential benefits for another sector of society if the government cooperates. The incentives essay discusses this more in depth.
Smart Sanctions
The focus on political concessions has led to an analytical and practical distinction between comprehensive or "dumb" trade sanctions and targeted or "smart" sanctions, with a shift from broad economic sanctions that hurt entire populations to more specified sanctions aimed at governing or military bodies.[16] Yet, David Cortright and George Lopez find that so-called "smart" sanctions carry much less weight, are easily circumvented and, as a result, have less chance of success, whereas, on average, comprehensive sanctions have been more effective.[17]
Nonetheless, recognizing the often-unacceptable human costs associated with comprehensive sanctions, and the unlikely potential for holding together such an international coalition (indeed, there have been only four U.N.-approved comprehensive sanctions), Cortright and Lopez provide specific recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. They recommend maintaining a list of individuals and entities responsible for, or supportive of, objectionable policies in targeted countries, who are then subject to financial sanctions and seizures, as well as travel bans. When whole sectors of society, such as businesses or communities, are the targets, they recommend expanding sanctions to strategic commodities, such as arms (although arms embargoes have traditionally lacked adequate enforcement), petroleum products, and commodities of great value to decision-makers (e.g. diamonds in Africa).
Conclusion
The effectiveness of sanctions is questionable. It is clear that the more harm sanctions have on their target, the more likely they are to influence the target's behavior. The human costs of such sanctions, however, are often unacceptable and make international support unlikely. Moreover, sanctions are likely to have greater effect on their target if the target government is faced with domestic opposition; otherwise, sanctions may simply encourage greater political cohesion around the targeted leadership.
Conflict often arises due to one party's feeling that they lack political, economic, or security resources. Sanctions, by definition, intend to further weaken the target, increasing their anxiety, and escalating a conflict.
However, sanctions should not be wholly dismissed, as they have been effective in the past. If used thoughtfully, they can help to solve conflicts with a minimal amount of violence.
[1] The numbers vary from one study to another because different cases are examined and different measures are used.
[2] Peter Wallensteen, "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited." Uppsala Peace Research Paper No. 1. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. 2000. Available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UPRP_pdf/UPRP_No_1.pdf. (Accessed April 2, 2004.) (The numbers vary from one study to another because different cases are examined and different measures used.)
[3] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 118-123.
[4] Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, "Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: An Overview," in Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (eds.), Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), p. 3.
[5] Nancy Dunne, "Sanctions Overload," Financial Times (July 21, 1998), p. 19; as quoted in Geoff Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 2.
[6] Coercive diplomacy is the purposeful combination of threats and diplomacy aimed at "persuad[ing] an opponent to stop or undo his effort to alter a status quo situation that itself endangers the peace or...already involves naked military aggression." Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace press, 1991), p. xi.
[7] Ibid., p. 19.
[8] Louis Kreisberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 102.
[9] John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999), p. 43.
[10]For sources and debates regarding the effect of sanction on Iraq, see the Frontline story entitled the "The Debate over UN Sanctions," available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq/sanctions.html.
[11] Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1967), PP. 26-48.
[12] Daniel W. Fisk, "Economic Sanctions: The Cuba Embargo Revisited," in Chan and Drury (eds.). p. 65.
[13] Eileen M. Crumm, "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics," Journal of Peace Research Vol. 32, No. 3 (1995), pp. 313-330.
[14] Ashton B. Carter, Marcel Lettre and M. Shane Smith, "Keeping the Technological Edge," in Ashton B. Carter and John M. White (eds.), Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 127-162.
[15] David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19-38.
[16] For instance, see David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002).
[17] David Cortright and George A. Lopez, "Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions," in Cortright and Lopez (eds.), pp. 1-22.
Use the following to cite this article:
Smith, M. Shane. "Sanctions: Diplomatic Tool, or Warfare by Other Means?." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: April 2004 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sanctions/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Selden, Zachary and Stanley A. Weiss. "'Often Worse than Ineffective' Sanctions: Don't Love Them or Hate Them, Make Them Work." , 1999
Available at: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1999/issue2/0299p54.htm.
This authors of this online article suggest that "economic sanctions are a tool that can induce changes at the margins and can be combined with other forms of pressure to exert greater changes. In and of themselves, they only succeed when the goals are modest, the sanctions are chosen properly and they enjoy the support of key countries. If used properly, sanctions will be neither loved nor hated. That realization alone will go a long way towards making them more effective."
Wallensteen, Peter. "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited." ,
Available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UPRP_pdf/UPRP_No_1.pdf.
This online paper looks at sanctions and the surrounding debates in a historical context with particular attention to the successes and failures of sanctions. Wallensteen concludes that economic sanctions are rarely effective because the necessary international context is generally lacking. Specifically, he suggests that multilateral coordination is needed in combination with significant domestic forces in the target country that are in opposition to the targeted leaders. Otherwise, the targeted leadership is unlikely to be weakened sufficiently to change its policies.
Stremlau, John. Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
Available at: http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/sum/strel.htm.
This report builds on the deliberations of the economic sanctions working group of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Chaired by Ambassador Donald McHenry, the working group addressed the increasing importance of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War world and the role of the UN in mandating and monitoring multilateral sanctions. The report reflects the working group discussions, interviews with other experts in the field, and a review of the literature.
Cortright, David and George L. Lopez. Toward Ethical Economic Sanctions. Fourth Freedom Forum.
Available at: http://www.americamagazine.org/articles/lopez-cortright.htm.
With rising concerns over notions that sanctions are a morallly acceptable alternative to war, particularly in light of humanitarian crises in Iraq resulting from international sanctions, Lopez and Cortright reexamine the ethical underpinnings of sanctions. Currently, they suggest that sanctions "fall into a gray area between humanitarian law and the rules of warfare." They recommend applying the rules of just war as well as specific criteria to the use of sanctions, if they are serve a legitimate purpose in international affairs.
Rogers, Elizabeth S. "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict." , May 1996
Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/roe01/.
This paper assesses the academic writing related to the question: What are the prospects for using economic sanctions to prevent deadly conflict? The author also offers her own assessment of the efficacy of using sanctions for preventing deadly conflict based on her reading of relevant data.
Offline (Print) Sources
Martin, Lisa L. "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." World Politics 45:3, 1993.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions is often thought to be a function of international cooperation. That is, unilateral sanctions often have little influence because the targeted actor is likely to be able to acquire the banned material from other sources unless there is widespread sanction coordination. In this article, Martin looks at the problems associated with international cooperation and how a sanctioning country may be able to overcome these problems.
George, Alexander L. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.
George defines coercive diplomacy as the purposeful combination of threats and diplomacy aimed at persuad[ing] an opponent to stop or undo his effort to alter a status quo situation that itself endangers the peace or "already involves naked military aggression" (p. xi). This book provides a theoretical framework for and lays out the practical implications of using this strategy. He then looks at how the use of coercive diplomacy by the United States has played out in historical cases.
Cortright, David. "Powers of Persuasion: Sanctions and Incentives in the Shaping of International Society." International Studies 38:2, 2001.
This is an analysis of Hedley Bull's theory of international society. The author considers how sanctioning would fit into Bull's theory. The author is supportive of sanctioning as a tool to help shape international society.
Chan, Steve and A. Cooper Drury. "Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice." , 2000.
This edited volume examines the theoretical framework for and practical implications of sanctions as a purposeful policy aimed at influencing international behavior. Not only does it outline the philosophical underpinnings of trade sanctions as a foreign policy tool but it also uses those as guidelines for the authors to analyze how sanctions have been applied in past cases.
Clawson, Patrick. "Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement and Prelude to Further Action." Ethics and International Affairs 7, 1993.
This article looks at some major goals that have been set for sanctions and evaluates how effective sanctions have been at reaching those goals. It also examines the costs of sanctions, i.e., the impact on civilians and on international support for sanctions. Clawson concludes that sanctions are useful only as a short-term response in situations in which the world community is prepared to use force in the likely event that the target regime does not change its behavior. If there is not will to use force to back the sanctions, then the sanctions are morally dubious: they impose suffering and may cause deaths without offering a reasonable prospect of accomplishing good.
Mueller, John and Karl Mueller. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction." Foreign Affairs 78:3, 1999.
This article examines the human impact of economic sanctions in relation to other weapons used by major powers to coerce other nations and concludes that sanctions "may have contributed to more deaths during the post-Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history" (p. 43).
Cortright, David and George A. Lopez. "Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft." , 2002.
In light of the high humanitarian costs of recent international sanctions on Iraq and rising concerns regarding the effectiveness of sanctions in general, this edited volume reemphasizes the notion that sanctions should be geared toward policy-change not punishment. The authors distinguish between comprehensive or "dumb" trade sanctions and targeted or "smart" sanctions and evaluate the effectiveness and costs of both approaches, as has been applied through the United Nations since 1990. Then, they provide broad recommendations for future sanctions as well as pointing out specific policy options for reshaping the sanctions regime against Iraq, prior to the 2003 war in the Persian Gulf.
Baldwin, David A. "The Power of Positive Sanctions." World Politics 24:1, 1971.
This article explores the inaccurate tendency of scholars and practitioners to focus on negative as opposed to positive sanctions, and the potential value of strategically structuring incentives to shape social behavior.
Crumm, Eileen M. "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics." Journal of Peace Research 32:3, 1995.
This article provides a model for the value of both positive and negatvie incentives in international politics, with a particular focus on the impact of market forces on their implementation.
Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge. "UN Sanction Regimes and Violent Conflict." In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Edited by Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, September 2001.
This chapter examines the past effectiveness of multilateral economic sanctions in preventing, managing, and resolving violent conflict, their associated shortcomings and future prospects.
Pape, Robert A. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International Security 22:2, 1997.
This paper is meant to challenge growing optimism about the power of economic sanctions to prevent and/or mitigate international conflict. The author asks whether economic sanctions are an effective way to achieve international political goals or not. Furthermore, he considers whether sanctions are an effective substitute for war (as an independent mechanism, not in combination with force).
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Online (Web) Sources
Cortright, David. Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention.
Available at: http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/toc.htm.
"Carrots and sticks have always been used in combination in diplomatic affairs, but scholars and policymakers have focused more on the sticks than the carrots. In this provocative study, policy-savvy scholars examine a wide range of cases--from North Korea to South Africa to El Salvador and Bosnia--to demonstrate the power of incentives to deter nuclear proliferation, prevent armed conflict, defend civil and human rights, and rebuild war-torn societies. The book addresses the "moral hazard" of incentives, the danger that they can be construed as bribes, concessions, or appeasement. Incentives can take many forms--economic and political, as palpable as fuel oil and as intangible, yet powerful, as diplomatic recognition and 'constructive engagement.' The cases demonstrate that incentives can sometimes succeed when traditional methods--threats, sanctions, or force--fail or are too dangerous to apply." - Editorial Review
Creative Associates International. Sanctions/Embargoes.
Available at: Click here for more info.
Provides a brief decription of the logic and use of economic sanctions. It also provides examples of their use from South Africa, Iraq, Serbia, Guatemala, Central America in the 1980s.
Hoskins, Eric. The Impact of Sanctions: A Study of UNICEF's Perspective.
Available at: http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/6sanctns.htm.
This online working paper is an assessment of UNICEF's perspective toward sanctions and their impact on children. It makes several recommendations toward monitoring the impact of sanctions as they are being imposed in order to reshape them in a manner that is less costly to children.
The Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions.
Available at: http://www.smartsanctions.se/.
This website reports on the developments directly relating to the ongoing work of SPITS such as public presentations, new publications, etc as well as on new decisions by the UN Security Council on international sanctions.
"Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter." , 1900
Available at: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm.
This website lists the legal justification for UN sanctions under its Charter and it has links to the Resolutions ordering sanctions for the specific countries it has levied bans against.
Offline (Print) Sources
Cortright, David and George A. Lopez. Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Sanctions in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
"Since the end of the Cold War, economic sanctions have been a frequent instrument of U.N. authority, imposed by the Security Council against nearly a dozen targets. Some efforts appear to have been successful, others are more doubtful; all, though, have been controversial. This book, based on more than 200 interviews with officials from the United Nations and sanctioned countries and with other involved actors, provides the first comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions during the 1990s. The authors develop a set of criteria for judging the full impact of sanctions: political, economic, and humanitarian; and then provide detailed studies of 11 cases: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. They conclude with far-reaching recommendations for increasing the viability of sanctions as a productive diplomatic tool." --Publisher's Abstract
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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
Security Council . First Run Icarus Films. 1982.
The film reviews several United Nations Security Council cases involving disarmament and arms limitation agreements, security guarantees, deadlines, and sanctions. It explains the role formal intermediaries and elite leaders play in the enacting and enforcing of UN policies. Click here for more info.
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