Peace Agreements


By
Nita Yawanarajah
Julian Ouellet


September 2003
 

What are Peace Agreements?

This essay was written in collaboration with the UN Peacemaker Databank, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations. This databank will be available online beginning in April 2006.

Peace agreements are contracts intended to end a violent conflict, or to significantly transform a conflict, so that it can be more constructively addressed. There are various types of agreements that can be reached during a peace process. Each type of agreement has a distinct purpose and serves a value in itself towards building positive momentum for a final settlement. These agreements, however, are not easily distinguished, as the content may sometimes overlap. Not all types of agreements are needed for each conflict. Some processes may have step-by-step agreements that lead towards a comprehensive settlement. Other peace processes may seek to negotiate one agreement comprehensively.

While categorizing each document that is negotiated during a peace process is often difficult, the following are common classifications used by the United Nations to differentiate the various types of peace agreements:[1]

  • Cessation of Hostilities or Ceasefire Agreements

    A ceasefire agreement refers to a temporary stoppage of war or any armed conflict for an agreed-upon timeframe or within a limited area. Each party to the agreement agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions, without necessarily making concessions of any kind. These agreements are military in nature and are basically designed to stop warring parties from continuing military actions while political negotiations are conducted to find a more durable solution. By themselves, ceasefire agreements are typically short-lived and fragile. They must be quickly followed up with further agreements if the ceasefire is to be maintained.



    Additional insights into peace agreements are offered by Beyond Intractability project participants.

  • Pre-Negotiation Agreements

    Pre-negotiation agreements are those that define how the peace will be negotiated. These agreements determine procedural issues such as schedules, agendas, participants and location, as well as the peacemaker's role and the procedure for drafting later framework or comprehensive agreements. The management of a peace process often determines if an agreement will be reached. Pre-negotiation agreements serve to structure negotiations and keep them on track. They facilitate the management of a peace process in order to reach its goal of ending the conflict. Pre-negotiation agreements usually signal the first achievement of success in a peace process, and thereby serve to build confidence and promote trust between the parties.

  • Interim or Preliminary Agreements

    Interim or Preliminary agreements are undertaken as an initial step toward conducting future negotiations. They are usually seen as "agreements to agree" or commitments to reach a negotiated settlement and build confidence between the parties. Such agreements do not normally deal with either procedural or structural issues, but may have some characteristics of a pre-pre-negotiation agreement, delineating when and how negotiations might be held. Interim agreements serve to signal that the ceasefire will be respected. Interim agreements are also used to restart a stalled peace process. Like ceasefire agreements, interim or preliminary agreements are not stable, and need to be followed with negotiations on procedural and substantive issues quickly to keep the new positive momentum of a peace process.

  • Comprehensive and Framework Agreements:

    The terms "Comprehensive Agreements" and "Framework Agreements" are often used interchangeably. However, there is a slight difference between the two types of agreements:

    • Framework Agreements are agreements that broadly agree upon the principles and agenda upon which the substantive issues will be negotiated. Framework agreements are usually accompanied by protracted negotiations that result in Annexes that contain the negotiated details on substantive issues, or are a series of subsequent agreements that are sometimes collectively known as the Comprehensive Agreement;
    • Comprehensive Agreements address the substance of the underlying issues of a dispute. Their conclusion is often marked by a handshake, signifying an "historical moment" that ends a long-standing conflict. Comprehensive agreements seek to find the common ground between the interests and needs of the parties to the conflict, and resolve the substantive issues in dispute.

       

  • Implementation Agreements

    Implementation Agreements elaborate on the details of a Comprehensive or Framework Agreement. An implementation agreement almost always requires a new round of negotiations with the relevant parties. In these negotiations, framework or comprehensive agreements are fine-tuned and given specificity. The goal of implementation agreements is to work out the details and mechanics to facilitate implementation of the comprehensive agreement. Implementation agreements are not always formally written documents. Sometimes they are verbal commitments, exchanges of letters, and joint public statements that help move implementation forward. Due to this fact, it is usually very difficult to keep track of implementation agreements. Often, the informal nature of these agreements makes it more difficult to hold the parties to their commitments. While formally written implementation agreements often take a longer time to achieve, there is usually a perception that the parties are committed, serious and obligated to implement these agreements.

Structure and Substance of Agreements

Peace agreements are not always structured in the same way. Sometimes they are just one document consisting of various chapters or discrete components. In other instances, each substantive component can be part of one comprehensive agreement or be a stand-alone agreement that is negotiated separately and during different periods of a peace process. The substance of an agreement also differs from conflict to conflict. The type of war, the issues in dispute and how the war is brought to an end are factors that will alter the structure and substance of a peace agreement. Intra-state or civil wars are usually caused by a failure of governance. Peace agreements that bring these conflicts to an end often focus, therefore, on rebuilding governance mechanisms. The disputed issues in inter-state wars are normally about security or territory. Peace agreements that bring inter-state conflicts to an end primarily focus on arrangements to enhance security and provide clarity on territorial issues.[2] Thus, the substance of peace agreements in each of these cases will naturally be different. The manner and method by which a war is brought to an end also affects the substance of an agreement. Violent conflicts, whether inter- or intra-state, typically end in one of three ways: an agreement on the terms of surrender, a partial agreement, or with a full peace agreement.[3]

  • Terms of Surrender occur when one party has clearly defeated the other party and the losing party has surrendered. The terms of such agreements are usually favorable to the victors. Such agreements are generally stable.
  • Partial Agreements only involve some of the parties and/or some of the issues. Partial Agreements are reached because it is sometimes not possible for all parties to converge on resolving the conflict at the same time or the parties cannot address all the issues at the same time. Partial Agreements are sometimes useful as an interim step to reaching a full agreement. These agreements can sometimes be stable but they may not necessarily lead to sustainable peace. Partial agreements require subsequent political processes that include the disenfranchised parties and address the remaining issues, in order to become a final settlement leading to a stable peace.
  • Full Agreements involve all relevant parties negotiating a lasting peace. This is the end result of a comprehensive agreement combined with the necessary implementation agreements. Generally speaking, peacemaking efforts tend to be focused on reaching comprehensive agreements. Full agreements seek to have all parties to a conflict agreeing on resolving all major issues.

Components of Peace Agreements

Most peace agreements address three main concerns: procedure, substance and organization.

  • Procedural Components

    Procedural components set out the processes that establish and maintain peace. They delineate the HOW of a peace process by establishing the processes and measures that help build the peace. These include the establishment of schedules and institutions that facilitate the implementation of substantive issues such as elections, justice, human rights and disarmament.

  • Substantive Components

    Substantive components are part of the agreement that define WHAT is going to change after the peace agreement is reached. Substantive components include political, economic, and social structural changes that are needed to remedy past grievances and provide for a more fair and equitable future. Substantive components, therefore, include the changes that are required in issues such as the distribution of power, the management of natural resources and the type of mechanisms to address past injustices.

  • Organizational/Institutional Components

    Organizational/institutional components are arrangements/mechanisms intended to promote the peace consolidation efforts after the agreement. They address the WHO element of the agreement. These mechanisms are either directly responsible or provide oversight and guidance to other actors to carry out the activities intended to consolidate the fragile peace and lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. There are two types of organizational components. The first, often referred to by the United Nations as “implementation mechanisms,” immediately follow a peace agreement and are intended to promote agreement implementation.

    Implementation Mechanisms are designed to provide:

    • A neutral monitoring capacity to ensure peace agreement commitments are honored,
    • A steering capacity which sets priorities and keeps the peace implementation on track,
    • A political forum which allows parties to resolve implementation disagreements through political negotiations.

     

    Implementation mechanisms could include a United Nations or regional peacekeeping operation. They can also entail monitoring committees, chaired by the United Nations or a neutral third party, which includes parties to the conflict and other relevant actors required to help build the peace.

    The second type of organizational/institutional component is designed to resolve subsequent/future conflicts over substantive issues, such as the abuse of state power in relation to human rights and the promotion of transparency and accountability in governance. These mechanisms, often referred to in the United Nations as “peacebuilding mechanisms” help promote the culture of peaceful conflict resolution in a society and public confidence in the state’s capacity to resolve future grievances systematically and impartially.

    Peacebuilding mechanisms are designed to provide:

    • A neutral structure and capacity within the state to resolve future conflicts and complaints.
    • A means for the peaceful resolution of public grievances before they become a source of conflict in a society.
    • A means for preventing future conflicts.
    Peacebuilding mechanisms could include the setting up of a new office of ombudsperson, a commission on human tights and the strengthening of the judiciary with international advisory and/or monitoring capacity.

     

    Plan for the Following Sections

    This building block has laid out the basic ideas for understanding the nature of peace agreements. Much remains to be said. Other building blocks in this group add further information. The section immediately following this one covers the substantive provisions of peace agreements, specifically dealing with types of agreements that can ameliorate intractable conflicts.

    In any protracted violent conflict, transgressions against justice are inevitable. Peace agreements must be structured to acknowledge these transgressions and in most cases to bring justice to the injured parties. The section on Addressing Injustice, by Michelle Maiese, lays out a framework for categorizing injustice and, subsequently, strategies for addressing injustice in the structure of peace agreements.

    Sometimes, peace agreements cannot be negotiated until the involved parties can agree on some form of security guarantees. Jill Freeman addresses the value of security guarantees as an effective strategy for peacebuilding.

    In many cases, when political or economic resources are scarce, political entrepreneurs will activate latent cultural or religious identities to build power bases capable of acquiring and controlling those resources. Unfortunately, those cultural roots are often used to perpetrate horrific crimes during the course of a war; crimes that only help entrench and perpetuate these identities. Whether or not these identities are real or perceived, there is a high value placed on them during intense and protracted conflicts. Thus, one of the most difficult tasks in structuring peace agreements is allowing for reconciliation in order to build trust and restore "normal" relationships between the warring factions.

    Rebuilding the social fabric between states or within a state can be tremendously difficult. In some cases state building or nation-building can seem downright impossible. (The experience of the U.S. in Iraq in 2004-5 is certainly an example illustrating that it is, if not impossible, much more difficult than the U.S. Government expected!) The section on social-structural aspects of peace agreements deals with how to acknowledge and resolve some of these issues.

    It is important to focus on strategies for power sharing, election monitoring, and nation building for a complete understanding of structuring peace agreements after civil war. While each issue by itself may seem small, the success or failure of any given intrastate peace agreement usually turns on the success of these provisions.

    --------------------------

    [1]"Peace Agreements" in UN Peacemaker Databank, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations. Forthcoming online April, 2006.

    [2]Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreement," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (Fall 1997), 339.Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreement," Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (Fall 1997), 339. and Caroline Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 3-22.

    [3]Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict."

       

Use the following to cite this article:
Yawanarajah, Nita and Julian Ouellet. "Peace Agreements." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/structuring_peace_agree/>.

Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic

Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:

Online (Web) Sources

Stedman, Stephen John. "Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers." , May 1, 2001
Available at:
http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/Pdf_Report_Implementing.pdf.

This paper evaluates peace agreement implementation strategies, the relative importance of implementation sub-goals, and the linkages between negotiation, implementation and long-term peacebuilding.

O'Toole, Kathleen. Why Peace Agreements Often Fail to End Civil Wars.
Available at:
Click here for more info.
This is a brief summary of conference held in Stanford in 2001. Itis a well-written news article laying out key points of peace agreement failure in a concise fashion.

"Why Peace Agreements Succeed or Fail." Peace Watch Online , December 1996
Available at:
http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/1996/1296/peace.html.

This article argues that effective implementation is crucial to the success of a negotiated peace settlement process.

Offline (Print) Sources

Gibler, Douglas M. "Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty, Vol. 15." Conflict Management and Peace Science 15:1, 1996.
This article counters a large amount of evidence that indicates that alliances are more often followed by war than by peace. Rather than contributing to the expansion of war, this article argues that a significant number of alliances are not followed by war. The piece identifies many of these peaceful alliances as territorical settlement treaties, which remove one of the most contentious issues from the agenda of states and often pacify tradiationally belligerent states.

Hartzell, Caroline. "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 43:1, January 1, 1999.
"Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized--that is, that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power--are the ones most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition."--abstract

Rothchild, Donald S. "Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S., Stephen John Stedman and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, January 1, 2002.
Rothchild focuses on key differences between elites and the masses, and groups and individuals as decisive factors in the success of peace agreements. He argues that peace agreements have to acknowledge the security concerns that vary between these levels and scopes and provide security provisions that answer all of them.

Stedman, Stephen John. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." International Security 22:2, January 1, 1997.
This article discusses the important issue of spoilers, or extreme parties that purposely do whatever they can to disrupt peacemaking processes for fear of losing power. This study begins to develop a typological theory of spoiler management. The goal is to identify strategies that spoilers may potentially use. In addition, the research intends to outline strategies that policymakers and negotiators can use to diagnose the type of spoiler and effectively deal with them in order to keep peace processes on track.

Werner, Suzanne. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." American Journal of Political Science 43:3, January 1, 1999.
This article identifies three explanations for postwar instability and the failure of peace agreements and tests hypotheses derived from each perspective. The three explanations revolve around: (1) failure to resolve the issues in dispute; (2) the problem of enforcement; and (3) spoilers' incentives to renegotiate the terms of the settlement.

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Examples Illustrating this Topic:

Online (Web) Sources

Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives.
Available at:
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/index.php.
This is the index page of the Accord Series, which includes twelve journal volumes, each of which focuses on the dynamics and details of a different conflict and subsequent peace process. The issues cover initiatives coming out of violent conflicts in the following places: Papua New Guinea; northern Uganda; Tajikstan; Sierra Leone; Northern Ireland; Georgia-Abkhazia; Mindanao; Cambodia; Sri Lanka; Mozambique; Guatemala; and Liberia.

Nesbitt, Dermot. "An Assessment of the Belfast Agreement." Accord, Vol. 8 , December 1999
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This article reviews the stipulations of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, as well as examining its shortcomings. Intra-state conflict is noted as becoming the primary threat to peace in Europe. The Belfast Agreement is thus considered to represent a significant attempt to deal with issues that affect all situations of inter-group conflict within nation states.

Lode, Kare. "Mali's Peace Process: Context, Analysis and Evaluation." , 1900
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This case study illustrates the importance of civilian security guarantees as well as the multiple relevant levels of importance for designing peace agreements. In the case of Mali, peace was not sustainable until local actors could give local security guarantees.

Peace Agreements 1989-1999.
Available at:
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/.
This site provides a list of peace agreements between the years of 1989 to 1999. Agreements are grouped by continent, and links to the full text are provided where available.

Peace Agreements Digital Collection. United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
Available at:
http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html.
The Peace Agreements Digital Collection strives to contain the full text of agreements signed by the major contending parties ending inter- and intra-state conflicts worldwide since 1989. This page offers access to peace agreement texts from settlements around the world.

Recent Peace Agreements and Cease-Fires.
Available at:
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/metadata/agreement.html.
This is an extensive list of recent peace accords and cease-fires arising from protracted ethnic conflicts around the world. They reveal that despite the headlines of intractable ethnic conflicts, many efforts are being made to manage ethnic conflicts more effectively.

Slim, Randa M. and Faredun Hodizoda. "Tajikistan: From Civil War to Peacebuilding." , 2002
Available at:
Click here for more info.

This article discusses the civil war in Tajikstan, which broke out soon after the nation declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The majority of the article focuses on the successful peace process initiated by the United Nations that led to the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan in 1997.

Offline (Print) Sources

Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg. "Armed Conflict, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreement." Journal of Peace Research 34:3, January 1, 1997.
In this section Wallensteen and Sollenberg distinguish between types of peace agreements. Separate from the simple understanding that not all peace agreements are the same it is useful to use their heuristic to understand that different peace agreements respond to different initial situations.

Stanley, William and David Holiday. "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
Discusses the formation and implementation of the UN-sponsored peace accord in Guatemala.

Bose, Sumantra. "Flawed Mediation, Chaotic Implementation: The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implentation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
This example provides two key lessons on designing peace agreements. First, mediation and implementation must be connected, namely the Tamil Tigers were not part of the mediation process which hindered implementation. Second, the intervention of a regional hegemon can be controversial because they are often not seen as neutral.

Cousens, Elizabeth M. "From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Stedman, Stephen John, Donald S. Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
This chapter examines the period after the Dayton accords to see if the agreement contributed to a continued lack of resolution of the conflict. Each achievement of the agreement has been accompanied by what Cousens calls "subversive elements," or side-effects. She argues that the agreement was a dissatisfiying compromise, put burdens on the implementors to taylor it toward either separation or integration, and provided significant authority to international actors, which was unfortunately often squandered.

Peou, Sorpong. "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
Provides an overview of the UN-sponsored peace agreement in Cambodia and, in evaluating its implementation, argues it has been a "qualified success." The chapter also discusses the factors limiting the effectiveness of the agreement. It also focuses on the interests of the different parties to the agreement.

Khadiagala, Gilbert. "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S. and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
The Arusha Accords will go down in history as one of the most dismal failures of international diplomacy. Khadiagala details the issues that led to failure of the Arusha Accords and the subsequent Tutsi genocide.

Adebajo, Adekeye. "Liberia: A Warlord's Peace." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothstein, Robert L., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
Examines ECOMOG's efforts to end Liberia's civil war. The chapter argues that ECOMOG's success has been limited (and the civil war persisted) by a continued difficult situation in Liberia, an emphasis on coersion, and a lack of attention by the international community. The chapter provides a background on the civil war and outlines the phases of the peace process. It is not optomistic about continued peace.

Zahar, Marie-Joelle. "Peace by Unconventional Means: Lebanon's Ta'if Agreement." In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Edited by Rothchild, Donald S., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
The chapter argues that the Syrian presence has allowed medium term successful implementation of the peace agreement by bringing stability.

Ratner, Steve R. "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements." The American Journal of International Law 87:1, 1993.
This article presents a legal analysis of the Paris Agreements, reached in October 1991 in hopes of bringing a 21-year conflict to an end in Cambodia. The paper explicates the structure and content of the agreements and also provides historical background on the conflict and the negotiating context. The meat of the paper analyzes significant legal aspects of the Paris Agreements, particularly in relation to international law.

Alden, Chris. "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique." Journal of Modern African Studies 33:1, 1995.
The article details the United Nations' role in implementing the key provisions of the Mozambican peace agreement.

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Beyond Intractability Version II
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Project Acknowledgements

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