Technical Facts


By
Norman Schultz


November 2003
 




What is a Technical Fact?

A technical fact is a fact that requires some practical, trade, or scientific expertise in order to discover, verify, explain, and understand. For example, technical facts would answer the following questions:

  • What kinds of anesthetics are used on terminal cancer patients?
  • How many parts-per-million of Dioxin does the local paper mill emit each month?
  • What is the average annual water yield of the Colorado River?

When Do Technical Facts Matter?

Technical facts can play multiple roles in conflict situations. Disagreement over a technical fact can be the cause of a conflict. In other situations, a disputed technical fact can complicate an already costly conflict, adding to its intractability.

For example, an environmental activist group protests the use of an incinerator to dispose of local contaminated soil that is currently polluting the underground water table. The activist group opposes the incinerator because of the pollution it will emit - incinerators have been proven to release highly toxic substances into the atmosphere in many previous cases. On the opposing side are the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, both saying that the type of contamination the soil contains is such that incineration is the least-polluting method of disposal available.[1] Who is right? Understanding both the level of water pollution caused by the contaminants and the level of air pollution that will be caused by the incinerator, and being able to intelligently compare the heath risks of each option, requires some technical expertise. Until these kinds of technical facts can be established and accepted, such a conflict is likely to linger and escalate.

Although technical facts play an obvious and central role in some conflicts, their role in other conflicts may be unclear. For example, consider the role of technical facts in the 2002-03 conflict between the United States and Iraq, specifically the facts regarding Iraq's military capability and their possible production of weapons of mass destruction. These technical facts were not the sole cause of the conflict, and may not even have been the core issue: Saddam Hussein's violations of treaty agreements, his disregard for human rights, and general defiance of the international community, were all central matters of concern.[2] But the conflict was complicated by the confusion over the technical facts. The possibility that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was the main sticking point for unified action on the part of the United Nations' Security Council.



Peter Woodrow observes that personal interactions, more than technical expertise, is key to intervenor effectiveness.

Standards of Proof

Verification of a technical fact is no different from any other kind of 'fact': the claim must be proven to be true. Some technical facts are such that simple observation provides sufficient proof. For example, a disagreement about recent gasoline prices can be easily settled by simply going to a gas station.

Other kinds of facts require more elaborate standards of proof, standards that are best known to experts in the appropriate fields. Experts are privy to the appropriate methods involved in discovering and proving the facts. Experts are also in the best position to expose fraudulent information, or simple errors. For example, the untrained eye would not be able to recognize the signs of a highly destructive weapons manufacturing plant -- it would look from the outside at least to be just another manufacturing company. Nor would the layman be able to assess the dangers of a given dioxin level in the atmosphere. Some conflicts, involving or based on disputes over technical facts, demand the use of technical experts.

Once this need is established, the conflict takes on a new set of dynamics. First, the phenomenon of "adversary science" must be dealt with. Each side will try (and very often succeed) to use experts that will support their position and oppose the opposition's. As a result, the conflict quickly becomes complicated by such contradictory information. Participation in neutral expert fact-finding is one way of avoiding the problems inherent in adversary science and the bias that comes with it. Second, knowing that a conflict demands the employment of experts gives rise to the challenge of defining exactly who an expert is, demanding that authentic experts be distinguished from fraudulent experts.[3] Finally, if the fact-finding strategies the parties use, whether neutral or biased, are successful in establishing factual conclusions, the parties must still be able to effectively communicate the facts and persuade those involved to believe the information.


[1] This scenario closely resembles the conflict over the Drake Chemical Superfund site (Lock Haven , Pa., USA) when AIR, a non-profit environmental activist group, strongly opposed the EPA's recommendation to use an incinerator for site's cleanup. See Region 3: Mid-Atlantic Region Hazardous Site Cleanup Division. Environmental Protection Agency [on-line] Available from http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/super/PA/drake/ Accessed on January 30, 2003.

[2] This would include violations of the Gulf War treaties as well as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention of 1975. Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT Obligations. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies. [on-line] Available from http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdf. Accessed on January 20, 2005.

[3] For example, one must make the distinction between authentic science and "psuedoscience," and this cannot be done simply by examining the experts credentials since highly trained scientists with advanced degrees have participated in fraudulent, fringe research."Psuedoscience." Skeptic's Dictionary. [on-line] Available from http://skepdic.com/pseudosc.html. Accessed on January 30, 2003.


Use the following to cite this article:
Schultz, Norman. "Technical Facts." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: November 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/technical_facts/>.

Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic

Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:

Online (Web) Sources

Adler, Peter S. "Managing Scientific and Technical Information in Environmental Cases: Principles and Practices for Mediators and Facilitators." ,
Available at:
http://www.mediate.com/articles/envir_wjc11.pdf.

"The document is an initial attempt to distill and disseminate those key principles and practices that are relevant to managing scientific and technical information in environmental conflicts. Through this project, we hope to advance both the practice and theory of environmental mediation and to launch further thinking and discussion on the issues raised."

Offline (Print) Sources

Burgess, Guy M., Sanda Kaufman and Robert Gardner. "Just the Facts, Please: Framing and Technical Information." In Environmental Practice. Edited by Gray, Barbara, Roy J. Lewicki and Michael Elliott, eds. Oxford, OH: Oxford University Press, September 2003.
In this article, the authors introduce the concept of framing theory in the context of environmental disputes. They examine the various ways that individuals and stakeholders in environmental policy disputes interpret, relate to, and understand technical and scientific facts. They offer solutions to reframe common relationships to highly technical information in ways that allow greater communication between parties to environmental conflicts.

Thomas, Stephen R., Marc J. Roberts and Michael J. Dowling. "Mapping Scientific Disputes That Affect Public Policymaking." 9:1, 1984.
"This article looks at what can and should be done to clarify and/or resolve scientific conflicts with policy implications." The writers differentiate between several *kinds* of scientific disputes, offer a few theories on how they work and how science is often used for tactical advantage. Click here for more info.

Majone, Giandomenico and William C. Clark. "The Critical Appraisal of Scientific Inquiries with Policy Implications." Science, Technology, & Human Values 10:3, July 1985.
A discussion of the pitfalls inherent in relying on pure science for policy recommendations, common scientifically internal problems of verification and evidence, and the problems when scientific inquiry is driven by policy. The overarching question the article aims to address is, exactly what is an appropriate role that science can plausibly take in policy decisions?

Brooks, Harvey. "The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes." Science, Technology, & Human Values 9:1, 1984.
An insightful discussion of the process and influence of technical disputes on public policy.

Brooks, Harvey. "The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes." Science, Technology, & Human Values 9:1, 1984.
An insightful discussion of the process and influence of technical disputes on public policy.

O'Brien, David. What Process is Due? Courts and Science-Policy Disputes. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987.
This book provides case studies and analyses regarding the relationship between scientific complexity and legal practices. The author questions the ability of courts to insightfully rule on scientific issues.

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Examples Illustrating this Topic:

Offline (Print) Sources

"Coping with Complex Facts and Multiple Parties in Public Disputes." In Consensus. Edited by Applegate, John S. and Douglas J. Sarno, eds.
An article discussing how a joint fact-finding team constructively addressed technically complex issues and, ultimately, reached consensus. Click here for more info.

"Human Embryonic Stem Cells: A Primer on the Technology and It's Medical Applications." In The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy (Basic Bioethics). Edited by Holland, Suzanne, Karen Lebacqz and Laurie Zoloth, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
This piece offers an example of a primer on technical facts.

Scher, Edward. "Negotiating Superfund Cleanup at the Massachusettes Military Reservation." In The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement. Edited by Susskind, Lawrence, Jennifer Thomas-Larmer and Sarah McKearnan, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999.
This case study reports on the consensus-building process used to outline plans to clean up the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). The longtime military base was found to be polluting the aquifer underneath it, which supplied drinking water to much of the Cape Cod region.

The Holston River Case. Directed and/or Produced by: Jagerman, Alexander.
In a public hearing regarding the waste permits pending resolution between the TEC and EPA, Phyllis Pierce (representing the League of Women Voters) said the following: "Many citizens - even well-educated ones - are intimidated by the mass of technical data, by the formalized procedure, and by the town and industry leaders in their suits and ties; particularly they are intimidated by the 'experts' the industrialists bring along to study their case ... "

Pence, Gregory E. "The Quinlan Case." In Classic Cases in Medical Ethics. McGraw Hll, 2000. Pages: 29-51.
This example illustrates the importance of technical facts (or a lack thereof) in public policy.

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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:

Offline (Print) Sources

Short Circuit . Directed and/or Produced by: Francovich, Alan. First Run Icarus Films. 1985.
The facts presented by a former director of El Salvador's death squads implicate the CIA in cover-ups and lies. Click here for more info.

The Secret Agent. Directed and/or Produced by: Keller, Daniel and Jackie Ochs. Green Mountain Post Films. 1983.
This film looks at the technical and legal facts associated with the "Agent Orange" class action suit. Click here for more info.

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Beyond Intractability Version II
Copyright © 2003-2006 The Beyond Intractability Project
Beyond Intractability is a Registered Trademark of the University of Colorado
Project Acknowledgements

The Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base Project
Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Co-Directors and Editors
c/o Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado
Campus Box 580, Boulder, CO 80309
Phone: (303)492-1635; Fax: (303)492-2154; Contact